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The record on appeal is the complete record of the
case in the Court below consisting of original papers
and transcripts of all proceedings of the Court, stipulations made and documents received.
The record shows the following facts:
That appellant acquired title to said land in
1915, and since that time has been and has remained and
still remains in actual occupancy of said land (through
his agents) as well as in constructive possession thereof.
Respondents have never occupied said land or any part
thereof., (Para. III App. Amended Answer to Complaint;
Para. 5 p. 6 App. Amended Cross-Complaint Replacing
his Third Amended Cross-Complaint; App. Answer to
Res. affinnative allegation contained in Res. Answer
to App. Amended Answer, Tr. of testimony of Clarence
I. Johnson).
(1)

Respondents commenced this action on September
22, 1948. (R. 1) It is a blanket action seeking to quiet
title claimed by respondents to numerous and separate
parcels of land against more than 50 defendants named,
including appellant, as to the said land to which this
appeal relates (Res. Complaint). The case was adjudicated and disposed of as to all other defendants on
March 1, 1950, when the court made its findings and
decree with respect to all other defendants (R. 108-19)
but held and decreed that "this decree shall in no manner affect the interest of CULBERT L. OLSON in and
to the North half of the Southwest quarter of Section
34, in Tp. 1 South of Range 1 East of the Uintah Special
1neridian ( 80 acres here involved) and this court reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tains jurisdiction over the said CULBERT L. OLSON
and the said land herein last described to n1ake such
further order, judg1nents and decrees as may determine
the respective rights of the plaintiffs herein and the
said CULBERT L. OLSON defendant." (Findings and
decree made by Judge TUCI(ETT March 1,1950. R. 119)
Appellant was not served and knew nothing of the
existence of this action until September 16, 1949, when
from the Clerk of said District Court, he received, by
registered mail, copies of the Summons and Complaint
at his office, 639 South Spring Street, (910 Stock Exchange Bldg.), Los Angeles, California.
Appellant duly served and filed his original answer
admitting that he clain1ed title to said land adverse to
plaintiffs, denied that the right, title and interest claimed
by him is without merit, prayed that the same be determined and for judgment quieting his title thereto against
the claims of respondents. (R. 84-7) Thereafter, April18,
1950, appellant served and filed an Amended Answer,
alleging title in himself as sole owner in fee simple of
said land; that he is in ·possession and entitled to the
possession thereof and praying that his title be quieted
against the claims of plaintiffs. (R. 201-3)
Upon filing his original Answer, appellant communicated with respondent's attorney GEORGE B. STANLEY, Heber, Utah, requesting information regarding
the basis of respondent's claim to said land, and asked
for his abstract of title thereto.
Quite some time thereafter, Mr. STANLEY (a
licensed abstractor), answered this request by telephone
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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saving he would send appellant his abstract of title. This
Mr. STANLEY finally djd, but not until the latter part
of December 1949, when on Dece1nber 19, 1949, appellant received from him at appellant's said Los Angeles
address, the abstract of title, which is a part of the
record, (Ex. A) and accompanied the same with the following letter (also a part of the record) (R. 326):
GEORGE B. STANLEY
Attorney at Law
Registered Abstractor
Phone 2-Heber, Utah
December 14, 1949
1\{r. Culbert L. Olson
Attorney at Law
639 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, California
Dear Mr. Olson:
"Pursuant to my telephone. conversation, I
enclose herewith abstract of title No. 790, prepared by Stanley Title Company, last certificate
dated November 23rd, 1949, at 5:00 o'clock P.J\L
covering the North half of the Southwest quarter
of Section 34, in Township 1 South of Range 1
East of the Uintah Special :Meridian.
"You will note at page 34 that Uintah County
8old this property on September 30th, 1940, and
that the contract was fully paid and deed issued
on September 22nd, 1943, as shown at page 37 of
the abstract.
••The ruling case is that of Bozievich v.
Schlecta, 166 P. 2d 239, in that case, the Auditor's
Tax Deed was stipulated by the parties to be
absolutely void. In spite of that fact, when the
county put into possession a tenant under its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
deed, the statute began to run, and seven years
thereafter, the purchaser under the contract was
held to be the legal owner.
"I also enclose a notice of continuance of
trial, which i~ now set for January lOth, 1950.
All of the evidence is in and if you desire to disclaim, kindly let me know immediately.
"I would appreciate an early return of the
abstract of title.
Yours very truly,
GEORGE B. STANLEY"
Upon a complete examination of said abstract of
title, after appellant had served and filed (January 9,
1950 R. 98-101) an original Cross-complaint to quiet
his title to said land against respondents (and other::-;
with respect to land in an adjoining county, mistakenly
included) appellant discovered the mention of a judgment entered by said court on November 13, 1946, in a
case (Civil No. 2388) wherein J. PARRY BOWEN was
named as plaintiff and appellant was named as defendant, quieting title to said land in said plaintiff (Abstract
of Title p. 51).
Thereupon (~larch 27, 1950), appellant served and
filed his First Amended Cross-complaint attacking said
judgment as being void, showing that appellant had not
been legally served with Summons and has no knowledge of the existence of said action or that plaintiff
claimed any interest in said land until after he was personally served with Summons and Complaint in the
present action, and alleging that the Court had no jurisdiction to enter said judgment against appellant. (R. 1926)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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At the satne ti1ne, appellant went to Y ernal, the
county seat of said county, from his home in Los Angele:;~
and examined the record ·in said Civil Action No. 2388.
While so doing and while there in the office of the County
Clerk, appellant 1net and· had a conversation with said
GEORGE B. STANLEY, attorney for respondents,
about said action and the invalidity of a default judgment entered therein against appellant. Following ar(:'
excerpts from the transcript of the record of proceedings
before the Court on April 3, 1950, n1ade in connection
with fixing a date for the trial of this case, with reference to said conversation and including stipulations with
appellant then made by respondents: (R. 188)
"1\fR. OLSON: Well, I will tell you, Mr.
Stanley, I will cooperate in having the trial just
as early as I can be prepared. If it can be tried
at an earlier date than May 8th and I can get
prepared, I will do it. And I can say to you, if
you change your pleadings and admit paragraphs
4 and 5 of 1ny Cross-complaint, that will facilitat(:'
the trial of the case, and reduce it to what I understood you to say; that is, that you 1nade no claim
under the tax deed and 1nade no claim under the
judgment that was referred to in those paragraphs, except the color of title.
"MR. STANLEY: I did tell you that we
would not rely on the tax deed, the validity of tlw
tax title, only that the Auditor's Tax Deed did
give the county color of title. And on the other
matter I may have gone a little too far in n1aking
the statement. Of course, I don't think that l
unqualifiedly said we \Vould not rely on the forSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mer action, I said o·ur position is we are not taking
that too seriously, I don't think 'tre will press it.
"1\IR. OLSON: Do you recall looking at the
files in this action with me in the Clerk's office!
""MR. STANLEY:

Ye.s, I did.

•• .MR. OLSOK: And do you recall saytng
that the judgment was no good?
'•:MR. STAKLEY:
worth much.

That I didn't think it was

":MR. OLSON: Well, I can say to you, if
the issues are resolved into the question of adverse possession and not on any claim of validity
of title under the tax deed, then I think we can
shorten it here. I will hasten insofar as I can get
here, get in touch with 1\fr. Johnson wherever he
is, I will phone Mr. Gatrell to find out if he can
get in a position to come. But, I can't be ready
before ~Iay 8th under your denials of my Crosscomplaint, allegations as to the tax deed and as
to the judgment, especially the former.
"1\ffi. STANLEY: Well, I will say this, as
far as the proposition of the tax deed is concerned, we will admit that it is not a valid tax
deed, that the proceedings in the matter are invalid because no auditor's affidavit has been filed
in the assessment rolls as required by law.
":MR. OLSON: Will you admit that the
taxes were illegally assessed in 1933 f

"1\fR. STANLEY: No.
"MR. OLSON:
legal?

And that the sale was il-

"MR. STANLEY: No. We think that is
inunaterial. The auditor's tax deed did give color
of title whether that was illegal or not.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
"l:lR. OLSON: In other words, you are willing to admit that the tax deed and the proceedings leading ttp to it were invalid and your only
claim is color of title under the tax deed; is that
it?
•'MR. STANLEY:
"~IR. OLSON:
in your Answer.

Well, now you don't say so

"MR. STANLEY:
don't.
"~IR.

OLSON:

That's right.

We don't say we do or we

Well, will you stipulate to

that?
•'MR. STANLEY:
stipulate to that.
•'THE COURT:
stipulation is what~

We will be willing to

Let me interrupt. Now your

":MR. STANLEY: The stipulation is to this
effect, Your Honor. That the tax deed to the
county, the auditor's tax deed to the county might
as well give you the book and page on it. The
Auditor's Tax Deed from F. L. Noal, as County
Clerk and ex officio County Auditor of Uintah
County, to Uintah County, recorded in Book 31
of Deeds at Pages 426 and 427, as Entry No.
10146, of the Records of Uintah County, Utah, is
invalid to convey title to the county for the reason that the auditor's affidavit required by law
was not attached to the assessmen.t roll."
Respondents had filed an Answer to appellant's
First Amended Cross-complaint (Trans. of Proceedings
~fay 3, 1950), in which respondents had alleged (Para.
III) that they claimed some right, title and interest, lien,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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encmnbrance and estate 1n the land described in appellant's First Atnended Cross-complaint adYerse. to
the right, title and interest of appellant, and alleged that
respondents are the owners and lessee in possession and
entitled to the possession of the land involved. Respondents (Para. Y) amnit the action and the entry of the
decree n1entioned in appellant's Cross-complaint (Para~
V) and denied all of the other allegations; and respondents further alleged (Para. VIII) that "they and their
predecessors in title have been in the open, notorious, uninterrupted, adverse, continuous, quiet and peaceful possession" of the land in question "under color of title
and claim of right ... for a period of more than seven
years prior to the commencement of this action," etc.
(R. 197-9)
Respondents further alleged (Para. IX) in their
said Answer that appellant had not been seized nor possessed of said land "within seven years before the commencement of this action" and that appellant is "barred
by the provisions of Section 104-2-5 Civil Code Annotated, 1943, as amended by Chapter 18, Laws of Utah,
1943 ; and by the provisions of Section 104-2-6, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, as amended by Chapter 20, Laws of
Utah, 1943."
Appellant then filed his Second, (209-15) and immediately thereafter, his Third Amended Cross-complaint, (216-23) attacking said judgment with more specific allegations as to its invalidity and the reasons
therefor than was given in his First and Second Amended Cross-c01nplaint, showing that service of Summons
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in said action did not comply with Sections 104-5-12, 1045-13, 104-5-15, Utah Code Annotated 1943 and alleging:
"That the affidavit for publication of Summons in said action was not made in good faith,
is insufficient and wilfully false; that it fails to
show due or any diligence to ascertain the residences of defendant therein, and said affidavit
is false in that it states that personal service on
this defendant could not be had; that said affidavit is false in that it states that the affiant, for
the purpose of finding said defendant, has made
diligent search and inquiry in the State of Utah,
and 'has checked the records in both' to determine
the last address of the defendant, and finds that
his last address was: 'Culbert L. Olson - Unknown,' whereas, the place of residence and known
address of this defendant and cross-complainant
was, at and long prior to the date of said affidavit,
and still is, recorded in the offices of the County
assessor and County Treasurer of Uintah County,
Utah, and is the same address at which defendant was personally served with Summons in the
present action; that this defendant and crosscomplainant's place of residence in the State of
California was at and long prior to the date of
said affidavit, and ever since that date, has been
well known in the State of Utah and in Uintah
County by citizens and public officials of said
State and County; and should have been well
known to the affiant in said affidavit; that a
mere casual inquiry by said affiant wo,uld have informed him of this defe~dant and cross-complainant's exact street address of his business office,
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639 South Spring Street, in the City of Lo~
Angeles, California, which is and has been his well
known and published business office address for
n1ore than twenty (20) years last past.
"That said void judgment does not vest in
J. PARRY BO,YEX, or any persons claiming
under him any right, title or interest in or to said
land; that said void judgment is a cloud on crosscomplainant's title, and cross-complainant is entitled to have the srune vacated and adjudged null
and void.
"Cross-complainant alleges further that he
never received actual notice of the filing of said
action or of any proceedings therein or connected
therewith, or that said J. PARRY BOWEN or
any of said cross-defendants claimed any interest
in said land until after this present action was
commenced and cross-complainant received service of Summons and a copy of cross-defendant's
Complaint herein, which was mailed to him at
his said address in Los Angeles, California;"
and prayed that said judgment be vacated and adjudged
null and void. (See 2nd and 3rd Amended Cross-conlplaints).
To this Third Amended Cross-complaint respondents answered, (R. 226-8) and admitted the entry of
said default judgment, and denying its invalidity, alleged that said judgment is res adjudicata, claimed title
to the land in dispute by adverse possession and alleged that appellant's claim thereto is barred by Statutes of Limitations (since held invalid by this Court),
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and by the Provisions of Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of· Procedure, 1950, and by laches. (Res. Ans. to 3rd Amended
Cross-complaint).
The case came on for trial before Judge Nelson on
May 1st, 1950, at which time respondents filed their said
Answer to appellant's Third Amended Cross-complaint,
after a motion was made by respondents to strike certain portions thereof. (R. 135) This motion to strike
was argued and submitted and taken under advisement
by the Court until the next day, :\lay 2nd, when it was
withdrawn by respondents without any ruling thereon.
(Trans. of Proceedings, R. 143) Then, on May 2, 1950,
· respondents, after introducing in evidence the judgment
roll in said default judgment action (Civil No. 2388)
orally made a motion for summary judgment on the following grounds: (R. 149)
"First, that the action on the judgment now
before the Court is barred by the provisions of
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
second, that action is barred by the laches of the
defendant CULBERT L. OLSON, and the crosscomplainant, on the basis of the n1atters appearing on the record before the Court; and, third~
that this action is barred for the reason that his
attack in this action is a collateral attack upon
a judgment of this Court, valid upon its face.
We would like to proceed with argument in connection with our motion, Your Honor."
This motion was then argued. The court took the
Inotion under advisement until Tuesday, May 9, 1950,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
and heard the testiinony of CLARENCE I. JOHNSON,
(R. 154-180) a witness for appellant brought fr01n California on the issue of adverse possession, showing actual possession of said land by appellant's agent and lieensee. (Trans. of Proceedings,

~fay

2, 1950).

Said abstract of title and respondent's admissions
and stipulation in open Court show that appellant is
record owner of said land unless the judgment in Civil
Action No. 2388 is a valid judgment.
On May 9, 1950, before the court ruled on said motion
for summary judgment, appellant made the following
offer of proof of the allegations of his Third amended
Cross-Complaint: (R. 182-185)
"I offer to prove the judgment in said action
of J. PARRY BOWEN versus CULBERT L.
OLSON, No. 2388, which my Cross-complaint in
this action attacks, is null and void, and ask to
have it vacated and adjudged null and void, and
all of the files in said action, including the affidavit of publication of Summons, if that affidavit
is not technically a part of the judgment role.
"I offer to prove that the statement in said
affidavit of publication of Summons in said aetion, that personal service of Summons in said
action could not be had, was wilfully false and
fraudulent.
"I offer to prove that the statement made in
said affidavit for publication of Summons, that
'affiant, for the purpose of finding said defendant, has made diligent search and inquiry in the
State of Utah, and has checked the records of
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both to determine the last address of the defendant, and finds that his l~st address was :"Culbert ,
L. Olson-Unknown"' besides being obscure as
to its intended meaning was wilfully false and
fraudulent.
"I offer to pro:ve that said affidavit, and the
said false and fraudulent statement therein, were
made for the purpose of avoiding personal service
of Summons in said action, as provided by law,
and prevented cross-complainant, defendant in
said action, from knowing that it existed. I offer
to prove that cross-complainant, defendant in said
action, was a resident of California, and that the
means of ascertaining his place of residence and
post office address in that State was well known
in Uintah County and in the State of Utah, and
in the offices of said County and State, when
said affidavit was made, and long prior thereto,
and that his post office address in California
necessarily became known to affiant in said action
in the preparation of his Complaint herein. I
offer to prove the following facts, which plaintiff
and cross-defendants in this action have agreed
to stipulate on, without the necessity of bringing
in the records thereof, that the assessment rolls
in the offices of the County Treasurer and of the
County Assessor of Uintah County, Utah, for
each and every year since 1929, until and including the year 1938 show that the land described in
the Complaint and judginent of the Court in said
action was assessed to: 'Culbert L. Olson, 910
Stock Exchange Building, Los Angeles, California.' That said address-910 Stock Exchange
Building, Los Angeles, California, is also 639
South Spring Street, the street number of said
Stock Exchange Building - Los Angeles, CaliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fornia, and that both addresses in said City refer
to one and the same place. That if Sununons
and Complaint in said action had been mailed
to said defendant at 910 Stock Exchange Building,
Los Angeles, California, they should have reached
said defendant at said address in due course of
the mail. That the Clerk of said court did not deposit a copy of the Summons and Complaint or
either of them in said action, addressed to said
defendant at said address in Los Angeles, California; that no copy of Summons and Complaint
or either of them in said action, addressed to said
defendant at said address in Los Angeles, California, was deposited in the post office directed
to the said defendant at his place of residence or
at any place, or at all; that said assessment rolls
also show that said land was not assessed for the
years 1939, 1940, 1941 and 1942; that the entry on
said assessment roll with reference to said land
for the year 1942 reads as follows: Uintah County,
and under the name Olson.
"I offer to prove that the post office address
of cross-complainant herein, defendant in said Action No. 2388, has been his post office address
as a resident of Los Angeles, California, since
the year 1929, and prior thereto; that his name
was printed in the telephone and city directories
of said city during all of said years.
"I offer to prove that cross-complainant since
1901 has been and still is a member of the Bar of
the State of Utah; that he is also a member of the
Bar of the State of California, and has been since
prior to 1923, and his said address has been listed
in the published legal directories of California
lawyers ever since 1929 and prior thereto.
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"I offer to prove that cross-complainant was
a member of the Utah State Senate from 1916 to
1920 inclusive, was a member of the California
State Senate from 1934 to 1938 inclusive, and was
Governor of California from 1938 to January
1943, which fact was widely publicized in the daily
and weekly newspapers of Utah, including papers
having wide distribution in Uintah County.
"I offer to prove that neither plaintiffs in said
action of 1946, and cross-defendants in the present
action, nor the person, or any of the persons, under whom he may claim color of title, never has
occupied and has never been in possession of the
land in controversy, and all of the allegations
contained in my cross-complaint.
"I offer to prove that until April 3, 1950,
at least, I was mislead by counsel for plaintiffs
and cross-defendants in believing that they conceded that said 1946 judgment is void; that they
would not rely upon said judgment and would
not resist my Cross-complaint to have the judgment vacated, and that misleading began with
the fact that they sued the same parties, sued me
in this action to quiet their title, and by the fact
that they set up in their Answer to my Second
Amended Cross-complaint the claim of title by
adverse possession. I call attention to the stipulation made."
To which counsel for respondents replied as follows:
(R. 185)
"MR. STANLEY: Even granting that all of
the proof offered by Mr. --------, all of the purported
proof which Mr. Olson says he will offer, if he
is permitted to offer proof regarding the invalidity of the judgment before the court, even though
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all that is granted and allowed in this case, he
would still be barred by the provisions of Rule
60(b) and he would still be barred by laches in not
asserting his claim for over three years after
the judg1nent had been entered."

Thereupon the court ruled as follows: (R. 186)
"THE COURT: The motion of the plaintiffs for judgment, that the court has had under
advisement, will be denied. The court is of the
opinion, however, as the record now stands, that
by virtue of the decree entered in No. 2388 Civil,
which has been introduced in evidence in this matter, that the matter in this action is res judicata
by virtue of that decree. The court is further of
the opinion, as the record now stands, that defendant CULBERT L. OLSON'S Cross-complaint is a
collateral attack."
Appellant then asked leave to further plead and was
granted 10 days in which to do so. (Trans. of Proceedings May 9, 1950, R. 186-7)
Appellant then duly served and filed his Cross-complaint "Amending and Replacing his Third Amended
Cross-complaint," repeating his charge that said judgment is void; that it was obtained illegally and by fraud
upon the Court and upon appellant and still more specifically and extensively setting forth the facts constituting the fraud perpetrated in obtaining said judgment.
(R. 230-6)
Following are the allegations of said Cross-complaint:
''1. That on November 13, 1946, in an action,
Civil No. 2388, brought by cross-defendant J.
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PARRY BOWEN, against this cross-complainant,
a Default Judgment was entered in this court adjudging that said cross-defendant J. PARRY
BOWEN was the owner of:
The North half ( ¥2 ) of the Southwest Quarter (:14) of Section 34, Township 1, South,
Range 1 East of the Uintah Special Meridian,
Uintah County, Utah.
as claimed in his Complaint in said action; that
said description describes the same identicall8lld
to which said J. PARRY BOWEN and said other
cross-defendants seek to quiet title in themselves
in this present action.
"2. That the claims in this present action,
Civil No. 2617, of cross-defendant J. PARRY
BOWEN, KEITH J. BOWEN, MORLEY DEAN,
IRENE M. DEAN, his wife, J. A. CHENEY, J.
R. ROBERTSON and GUY T. WOODWORTH to
title and ownership interests in said land, 8lld
the claim made in this present action by crossdefendant, PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, a corporation, to rights as lessee of mineral rights in said land, are all made under 8lld
by virtue of said Default Judgment against this
cross-complainant entered in said action, Civil No.
2388.
"3. Cross-complainant alleges that said Default Judgment entered against him in said action,
Civil No. 2388 is void, and cross-complain8llt
claims the right to have the same vacated as null
and void because and by reason of the following
facts:
" (a). That Summons in said action was not
served on this cross-complainant, the defendant
in said action, as required by law.
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··(b). That the affidavit for the Order signed
bv the Clerk of said court for service of Sumrnons
iii said action by publication, was insufficient in
that it did not state probatory or evidenciary facts
from which a judge or Clerk of said court could .
determine that the place of residence of the defendant was unk11own; that said affidavit did not
justify the issuance of said order by the Clerk
without his forthwith depositing a copy of the
Sununons and Complaint in the post office directed to the defendant at his place of residence:
that said affidavit does not state that the place of
residence of the defendant was unknown to the
plaintiff or to his attorney who made said affidavit; that said affidavit does not contain probative or evidenciary facts from which it could
be determined by a Judge or Clerk of said Court
that any effort was made by plaintiff or the affiant in said affidavit to ascertain the place of residence of the defendant, as a non-resident of the
State of Utah; that said affidavit does not contain
probative or evidenciary facts from which it could
be determined by a Judge or Clerk of said Court
what, if any diligence was used by said affiant in
his alleged 'diligent search and inquiry in the
State of Utah for the purpose of finding the defendant,' or in what record or where the affiant
found, as stated in his said affidavit, that the defendant's last known address was :
'Culbert L. Olsen -Unknown.'
"(c). That said affidavit is wilfully false
and misleading and fraudulent in that it states
that:
"Personal service thereon ( Surnmons) cannot
be had and •that affiant, for the purpose of finding said defendant has made diligent search and
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inquiry in the State of U tab, and has checked
the records of both to determine the last address
of the defendant, and finds that his last address
was:
"Culbert L. Olsen- Unknown."'
"(d). That nowhere did the affiant in said
affidavit for publication of Summons find in the
records of the State of Utah or the County of
Uintah, that the last address of cross-complaint
was 'Culbert L. Olsen-Unknown.'
" (e). That the Complaint, a Summons with
no return thereon, said affidavit for publication
of Summons, and the Order issued by the Clerk
of the Court for the publication of Summons, in
said action, in a weekly newspaper published in
Uintah County, were all filed and issued on the
same day, September 11, 1946.
"That said Order was signed by the Clerk as
prepared and directed by plaintiff's attorney,
without any judicial consideration by the Clerk
of said Court; that the Clerk of said Court did
not deposit a copy of the Summons and Complaint
or either of them in the post office directed to the
defendant at his place of residence or at any place,
or at all.
"' (f). That on November 12, 1946, a Proof
of Publication of said Summons without the address of plaintiff's attorney, and not made by the
proper person designated by Statute to make such
proof, was filed with a Precipe to enter Default
of defendant, and at the same time the defendant's
Default was entered by the Clerk of said Court.
"(g). That at the time said action was prepared and filed, the plaintiff and his attorney
who made said affidavit, and the Clerk of said
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Court had eonvenient means of knowledge of the
place of residence and exact post office addresR
of the defendant, CULBERT L. OLSON; that the
assessn1ent rollt:' in the offices of the County Assessor and County Treasurer of Uintah County,
next door to the office of said Clerk, showed plainly, with reference to the record title and assessment of and payment of taxes on said land, the
the name and exact post office address of said defendant in the City of Los Angeles, California;
that said assessment rolls for each and every year
since 1929 until and including the year 1938, then
showed as they now show, that said land was assessed to CULBERT L. OLSON, 910 Stock Exchange Building, Los Angeles, California, and
that said land was not assessed for the years 1939,
1940, 1941, and 1942.
"(h). That said post office address of thi~
cross-complainant, defendant in said action, Civil
No. 2388, has been his post office address as a
resident of Los Angeles, California, since the year
1929, and prior thereto; that his name and said
post office address were printed and published
in the telephone and city directories of said city
and in the published list of attorneys circulated
and distributed to la-vvyers and public officials
at the time of the commencement of said action,
and prior thereto; that cross-complainant, since
1901, has been and still is a member of the Bar
of the State of Utah, and since 1923, or prior
thereto, has been a member of the Bar of the State
of California; that cross-complainant was a member of the Utah State Senate from January 1917,
to January, 1921, and was a member of the California State Senate from January, 1935, to J anuary, 1939; that in 1948 cross-complainant was
elected Governor of California and served in that
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office from January, 1939, until January, 1943,
which fact was widely publicized in the daily
and weekly newspapers of Utah, including daily
newspapers of wide distribution in Uintah
County, and was known to the affiant in said affidavit; that cross-complainant was well known in
the State of Utah and among citizens of Uintah
County; that independent of the records of said
County, any good faith inquiry would have disclosed cross-complainant's place of residence and
post office address to any person seeking service
of Summons on him in said action.
" ( i). That said action was brought to quiet
title to said land in cross-defendant J. PARRY
BOWEN, against this cross-complainant; and
cross-complainant alleges that the plaintiff in said
action and the affiant in said affidavit, his attorney, in ascertaining their reasons for filing said
action, necessarily became acquainted with facts
leading to information as to the place of residence
and post office address of cross-complainant, defendant in said action.
"(j). That cross-complainant alleges that
said Order for publication of Summons was secured by said insufficient, false and fraudulent
affidavit for the purpose of preventing crosscomplainant from knowing the existence of said
action, and from appearing therein, and defending
his title to said land.
"4. Cross-complainant further alleges that
he never received any notice of any kind and did
not know of the filing of said action, or of any
proceedings therein or connected therewith, or
that said judgment had been entered, or that said
action ever existed, until long after he was served
by mail at his said Los Angeles, California, address, with copies of Summons and Complaint in
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this present action by J. PARRY BOWEN et al,
against this cross-complainant, Civil No. 2617, on
September 16, 1949; that cross-complainant attacked the validity of said Judgment immediately
upon learning that plaintiffs in the present action
were relying on said Judgment in support of their
claims made in this present action of ownership
and interests in said land as against this crosscomplainant, after being led by counsel for crossdefendants to believe that they did not intend to
rely on the validity of said Judgment and would
not oppose the vacation of said Judgment as being
invalid.
"5. That this cross-complainant, as defendant in said action, Civil No. 2388, has a good and
meritorious defense to the complaint therein in
the fact that cross-complainant, at the time of
the commencement of the said action, and for
inore than thirty ( 30) years prior thereto was,
and ever since remained, the sole owner of said
land in fee simple, in possession and entitled to
the possession of said land, and was and is entitled to have his title quieted against any claims
thereto made by said J. PARRY BOWEN, and
any and all persons claiming any title or interest
in said land under said Judgment.
WHEREFORE, Cross-complainant prays:
"1. That the said Judgment and Decree of
this Court made and entered on the 13th day of
November, 1946, in the case of J. PARRY
BOWEN vs. CULBERT L. OLSON, Civil No.
2388, be vacated and adjudged null and void, and
that this cross-complainant, defendant in said action be given the right to appear and answer,
and/ or otherwise plead to plaintiff's complaint
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therein, in order that the claims of the parties
to said action and of persons claiming any rights
or interests under and by virtue of said Judgment
shall be decided upon their merits.
"2. For such other and further relief as may
be just and equitable in the premises."
Respondents filed an Answer thereto which reads
as follows: (242-6)
"Come now the plaintiffs and cross-defendants in the above entitled action and present the
following defenses in answer to the cross-complaint of the defendant CULBERT L. OLSON,
amending and replacing his Third Amended
Cross-complaint:
FIRST DEFENSE

"The said cross-complaint fails to state a
claim against these plaintiffs and cross-defendant upon which relief can be granted, and plaintiffs and cross-defendants hereby move this Court
to dismiss said cross complaint of defendant CULBERT L. OLSON.
SECOND DEFENSE

"The relief prayed for by cross-complainant
in said cross-complaint is barred by the provisions of Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and is further barred by the laches of said
cross complainant, Culbert L. Olson.
THIRD DEFENSE

"Cross defendants further allege that at the
time of the commencement of this action they were
the owners and lessees, in the possessio':n and
entitled to the possession of the following described tract of land, situated in Uintah County,
State of Utah, to-wit: North Half (n/2) of the
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Southwest Quarter (SW/4) of Section thirty-four
(34) in Tow·nship nne (1) of Section thirty-four
(34) in Township one (1) South Range one (1)
East of the Uintah Special Meridian .
.. Cross Defendants further allege that they
and their predecessors in title have been in the
open, notorious, uninterrupted, adverse, continuous, quiet and peaceful possession of the, lands
described in the preceding paragraph abo:ve, under color of title and claim of right in good faith,
for a period of more than seven years prior to
the commencement of this action, and have paid
all taxes and assessments levied or assessed thereon during said period.
"Cross defendants further allege that the
cross complainant Culbert L. Olson, and all persons claiming by, through and under him, have
not been seized nor possessed of the land described above within seven years before the commencement of this action, and that any claim or
purported clailn of the said Culbert L. Olson to
the lands above described, is barred by the provisions of Section 104-2-5, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, as amended by Chapter 18, Laws of Utah,
1943; and by the provisions of Section 104-2-6,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended by Chapter 20, Laws of Utah, 1943; and by the provisions
of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1943, designated
as Section 104-2-5.10, as amended by Chapter
8, Laws of Utah, 1947.
FOURTH DEFENSE

"Cross defendants refer to all of the defenses
hereinbefore stated and the allegations therein
contained, and incorporate them herein as though
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tion, and for a fourth defense, the defendants specifically answer the allegations contained in said
cross complaint of defendant Culbert L. Olson,
amending and replacing his third amended cross
complaint, as follows:
"1. Cross defendants admit the allegations
contained in paragraph 1 of said cross complaint,
and allege that the said decree referred to was
duly and regularly entered and is res adjudicata
against all claims now made by the said cross
defendant.
"2. Cross defendants admit that they claim
title and ownership interests in said land under
and by virtue of said default judgment referred
to in the allegation of Paragraph 2 of said cross
complaint but deny that cross defendants' title
and ownership interests in said land rest solely
upon said default judgment against the cross
complainant and cross defendants allege that their
ownership and possession are based upon other
meritorious rights and claims.
"3. Cross defendants admit, that summons
in said action was not personally served on the
cross complainant, but deny all other allegations
of paragraph 3 (a); cross defendants deny each
and every of the allegations contained in paragraph 3 (b); cross defendants deny the allegations
contained in paragraph 3 (c) ; cross defendants
deny the allegations contained in paragraph 3(d);
cross defendants admit that the complaint, a
summons with no return thereon, said affidavit of
publication of summons, and the order issued by
the Clerk of the Court for the publication of summons in a weekly newspaper published in Uintah
County, were all filed and issued on the same day,
September 11, 1946, but cross defendants deny
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each and every of the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 3(e); cross defendants admit
that proof of publication was filed on November
12, 1946, with a precipe to enter default of defendants and at the same time the defendants' default was entered by the Clerk of said Court, but
cross defendants deny each and every of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 3(f);
cross defendants admit that the assessment rolls
for each and every year since 1929 until and including the year 1938 show that the land was
assessed to 'Culbert L. Olson, 910 Stock Exchange
Building, Los Angeles, California,' and cross
defendants deny each and every of the remaining
allegations contained in Paragraph 3(g); cross
defendants are without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the facts alleged
in paragraph 3(h) and therefore deny them, and
cross defendants specifically deny that the affiant in said affidavit knew that cross complainant
was elected Governor of California, that cross
complainant was well known in the State of Utah
and among the citizens of Uintah County, and that
any good faith inquiry would have disclosed cross
complainant's place of residence and post office
address to any person seeking service of summons
on him in said action; cross defendants admit
that said action was brought to quiet title to said
land in cross defendant, J. Parry Bowen, as
against the cross complainant but cross defendants deny each and every of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 3(i); cross defendants deny each and every of the allegations
contained in Paragraph 3 (j).
"4. Cross defendants are without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the following facts alleged in Paragraph 4 of said
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cross complaint; cross complainant further alleges that he never received any notice of any kind
and did not know of the filing of said action, or
of any proceedings therein or connected therewith, or that said judgment had been entered, or
that said action ever existed, and therefore, denies
them, and cross defendants deny each and every
of the remaining allegations contained in said
Paragraph 4 and allege that cross complainant
had actual notice of said decree against him on
December 19, 1949, and cross defendants specifically deny that cross-complainant was led by
counsel for cross defendants to believe that they
did not intend to rely on the validity of said
judgment and would not oppose the vacation of
said judgment as being invalid.
"5. Cross defendants deny the allegation
contained in paragraph 5 of said cross complaint
and allege that these cross defendants and plaintiffs are the owners and lessees in the possession
and entitled to the possession of said land and
the whole thereof."
WHEREFORE, cross defendants pray:
"1. That cross complainant, Culbert L.
Olson, take nothing by his cross complaint, amending and replacing his third amended cross complaint, and that the same be dismissed at cross
complainant's costs.
"2. That cross defendants and plaintiffs
have judgment against cross complainant and
defendant, Culbert L. Olson, quieting the title of
cross defendants and plaintiffs in and to the lands
subject to this action.
"3. That cross defendants and plaintiffs be
granted the prayers contained in the original
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complaint on file herein and that Plaintiffs and
cross defendants be awarded costs of suit.
"4. For such other and further relief as may
be meet and proper."
Appellants filed an Answer to the affirmative allegations of said Answer of respondents, which reads as follows: (R. 247 -9)
"Answering the cross-claim of cross-defendants to the cross-complainant of CULBERT L.
OLSON amending and replacing his Third
Amended Cross-complaint, said cross complainant,
"Denies each and every allegation contained
in the paragraphs of said answer designated as
cross-defendant's First Defense, Second Defense,
and Third Defense.
"Denies the same allegations incorporated in
the paragraph of said Answer designated as
cross-defendant's Fourth Defense, and denies the
allegation in paragraph 1 of said Fourth Defense
that said decree was duly and regularly entered
and is res adjudicata against all claims now made
by said cross complaint, and denies the allegations
contained in paragraph 5 of said F'ourth Defense
that these cross-defendants and plaintiffs are the
owners and lessee, in possession and entitled to
the possession of said land; and denies that said
cross-defendants or either of them or any person
under whom they or either of them claim an interest in said land were ever in the possession or
entitled to the possession of said land or any part
thereof."
On June 30, 1950, respondents served and filed another n1otion for summary judgment, which reads as
follows: (R. 253)
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"Come now the plaintiffs and cross-defendants in the above-entitled action and move the
court for summary judgment upon the record
now before the court, consisting of the files and
records in this matter, and the file in Civil Action
No. 2388, and abstract of title heretofore introduced in evidence. This motion is made upon the
following allegations:
"1. That the cross complaint of defendant
Culbert L. Olson amending and replacing his
third Amended Cross Complaint is a mere collateral attack upon the judgment in Civil Action
No. 2388, and said judgment and decree is res
judicata against the said defendant and crosscomplainant, Culbert L. Olson.

"2. That the attempt to set aside the decree
in Civil Action No. 2388 is barred by the provisions of Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
"3. That the defendant and cross complainant, Culbert L. Olson, is guilty of laches in defending this action.
"4. That the said Decree in Civil Action No.
2388 was duly and regularly entered, is not void
on its face, and is a vaild decree for all purposes."
This Inotion was noticed for hearing on July 14, 1950,
(R. 254) but was not heard by the Court until September
11, 1950, when it was argued and subn1itted for the
Court's ruling. (R. 256) The Court made no ruling until
January 25, 1951, when it made a minute order granting
said motion. (R. 258)
No notice of said ruling was given to appellant, and
appellant was not inforrned that a ruling had been made
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until nearly a n1onth had elapsed when, in response to
appellant's inquiry of Judge NELSON as to when a
ruling might be expected appellant was informed that the
motion had been granted on January 25, 1951.
No formal judgment was entered pursuant to said
ruling.
Appellant again communicated with Judge NELSON
on April 20, 1951, asking that a fina;l judgment be entered from which an appeal would lie and submitted a
formal judgment in accordance with his ruling for that
purpose.
Judge NELSON answered that request on April
23,1951,saying:
"I have this day talked with GEORGE
STANLEY, attorney for Mr. BOWEN, who states
that he prepared Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and decree in this matter and that the
same would reach me within two days. I shall
withhold the signing of the judgment you have
prepared until I have had an opportunity to examine the papers he is sending. Will advise you
further in the matter within the next few days."
Appellant received no further advice from Judge
NELSON, but did receive a letter from GEORGE B.
STANLEY, dated May 4, 1951, in which he states:
"I have been reluctant to bring the reason
for the delay to the attention of the Judge and
also to offer it as an alibi for not filing Findings,
Conclusions and Decree before ... "
However, Findings, Conclusions and Decree were
not served and filed until July 7, 1951.
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Said Findings and Conclusions are as follows: (R.
267-275)
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
"This matter came on regularly for trial on
the Complaint of the plaintiffs and the Amended
Answer of the defendant, and on the Third CrossComplaint of the cross- complainant, and the Answer thereto of the cross-defendants, before the
Court sitting without a jury on the first day of
May, A. D., 1950, and was continued to the second
day of May, and then to the ninth day of May,
1950, GEORGE B. STANLEY, ROSCOE
WALKER, Jr., and HUGH W. COLTON appearing as attorneys for the plaintiffs and cross-defendants, the defendant appearing in person and
by his attorneys CLYDE JOHNSON, Esq., and
CYRUS G. GATRELL, Esq., and the plaintiffs
and cross-defendants J. PERRY BOWEN also
known as J. PERRY BOWEN, KEITH J.
BOWEN, :MORLEY DEAN, IRENE M. DEAN
and J. A. CHENEY being personally present:
"And the Court having requested the respective counsel to state the issues to be tried, and
the various counsel having advised the Court that
the issues to be tried consisted of the following:
•'1. The validity of the Decree in Civil Action No. 2388 in this Court, wherein J. PERRY
BOWEN is plaintiff and CULBERT L. OLSON is
defendant, which decree was entered in said action
on the 13th day of November, 1946;

"2. The claim of fee simple title from patent
to the present time and claim of continuous possession by the defendant and C'ross-complainant,
CULBERT L. OLSON, as against the claim of adverse possession by the plaintiffs and cross-de-
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fendants for a period of n1ore than seven years,
and the further claim that said defendant and
cross-complainant was barred from maintaining
a defense or his cross-complaint by the limitations
stated in the pleadings of plaintiffs and crossdefendants ;
··And the Court having advised the respective
counsel that he would try first the issue on the
validity of the Decree in said Civil Action No.
2388, and if said decree were valid it would be res
adjudicata in this cause against the defendant and
cross-complainant, and the Court proceeded to
try the issue so stated;
"And the plaintiffs and cross-defendants reintroduced the abstract of title to the prope,rty
involved herein, and also introduced the file in
said Civil Action No. 2388, and the same were received in evidence without objection by the defendant and cross-complainant;
"And the plaintiffs and cross-defendants
thereupon moved the Court for judgment upon
the record before the Court, and the Court after
hearing the arguments of counsel denied the said
motion;
"And the Court further decided that the
Third Amended Cross-complaint of the said
CULBERT L. OLSON makes a collateral attack
on the said decree in said Civil Action No. 2388,
that said decree is a valid decree and is res adjudicata against the said defendant and crosscomplainant CULBERT L. OLSON on the issues
involved herein;
And the Court allowed the defendant and
cross-complainant ten days in which to further
plead, and the said defendant and cross-complainant filed his Cross-complaint Amending and ReSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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placing his Third Amended Cross-Complaint;
"And the plaintiffs and cross-defendants filed
an Answer to said last Cross-complaint, and also
made and filed a l\Iotion for Summary Judgment
upon the record before the Court, consisting of the
files and records in this matter, the file in said
Action No. 2388, and the abstract of title heretofore introduced in evidence;
•'And the Court heard the Motion for Summary Judgment on the eleventh day of September, 1950, and heard the arguments of GEORGE
B. STANLEY, attorney for plaintiffs and crossdefendants, and CLYDE S. JOHNSON, attorney
for defendant and cross-complainant, and after
examining the files, records and the briefs of the
respective parties in this matter, made and entered his minute entry on January 25th, 1951,
granting the Inotion of plaintiffs and cross-defendants;
"And being fully advised in the premises, the
Court now makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
.. 1. That the defendant and cross-complainant, CULBERT L. OLSON, is now and has been
for more than twenty years last past prior to the
commencement of this action a resident of the
State of California;

"2. That Civil Action No. 2388 was prosecuted in this Court by J. PERRY BOWEN, Plaintiff, against CULBERT L. OLSON, and unknown
defendants, to quiet the title of plaintiff in and to
the lands hereinafter described;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
"3. That the plaintiff and defendant in said
Civil Action No. 2388 are the same parties as
the plaintiff and cross-defendant, J. PARRY
BOWEN, and the defendant and cross-complainant, CULBERT L. OLSON in this action;
"4. That a Lis Pendens was made in said
Civil Action No. 2388, which Lis Pendens was
dated August 2-lth, 1946, and recorded September
11th, 1946, in Book '11' of Miscellaneous, page 1
of the records in the office of the County Recorder
of Uintah County, State of Utah;
"5. That the _A._ffidavit for Publication of
Summons in said Civil Action No. 2388 recite~
that the defendant, CULBERT L. OLSON, is a
non-resident of the State of Utah, and that his
address is unknown ;
"6. That a Decree was entered in this Court
in said Civil Action No. 2388 on November 13th,
1946, quieting the title of the plaintiff against
the defendant, to the lands hereinafter described,
which Decree was recorded December 2nd, 1946,
at 2:40 P.l\L, in Book "36" of Deeds, page 130
of the records in the office of the County Recorder
of said Uintah County, State of Utah.
"7. That the defendant and cross-complainant CULBERT L. OLSON received the Abstract
of Title No. 790 in evidence herein, on December
19th, 1949, which abstract of title at pages 51
and 52 sets forth in full a copy of the Decree as
recorded in said Book "36" of Deeds, page 130
of said county records ;
"8. That in the said Decree so made and
recorded this Court recited: "The defendants,
having been regularly served the Summons and
failed to answer the same or otherwise plead:"
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"9. That the defendant and cross-complainant, CULBERT L. OLSON made no attack on
the validity of the said Decree in said Civil
Action No. 2388 until the filing herein of his
First An1ended Cross-complaint on March 31st,
1950, more than three months after receiving
the abstract of title mentioned in paragraph 7
of these findings, and n1ore than three years after
the entry and recording of the said Decree;
"10. That the said Decree in said Civil
Action No. 2388 is not void on its face;
"'1. That the Cross-complaint Amending
and Replacing his Third Amended Cross-complaint made by the said CULBERT L. OLSON
does not ·allege that the said Decree in said Civil
Action No. 2388 is void on its face. and attacks
said decree on the ground of fraud.

"12. That by reason of the said Decree in
said Civil Action No. 2388 the plaintiffs and
cross""defendants are the owners and lessee in
the possession and entitled to possession of the
real estate hereinafter described;
"13. That the defendant and cross-complainant CULBERT L. OLSON, claims some right,
title interest, lien, encumbrance and estate in, to,
upon and against the real estate hereinafter
described or some part thereof adverse to the
.right, title, and interest in said real estate of
plaintiffs, but that the said defendant and crosscomplainant is estopped from setting up any claim
or claims to the hereinafter described real estate
by reason of the said Decree in said Civil Action
No. 2388;
•'14. That the plaintiffs and cross-defendants are entitled to a judgment and decree of this
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Court quieting their title in and to the land~
described in the C01nplaint and hereinafter particularly described, and for a further judgment
for their cost~ expended herein, against the said
defendant and cross-c01nplainant, CULBERT L.
OLSON.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the
Court no'v makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That the Cross-complaint of Defendant
CULBERT L. OLSON Amending and Replacing
his Third Amended Cross-complaint on file herein
is a mere collateral attack upon the judgment
in Civil Action No. 2388 in this Court, and said
judgment and decree is res adjudicata against
the said defendant and cross-complainant, CULBERT L. OLSON.

2. That the cause of action in said Crosscomplaint to set aside the Decree in said Civil
Action No. 2388 is barred by the provisions of
Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. That the defendant and cross-complainant, CULBERT L. OLSON, is guilty of laches
in the premises.
4. That the said Decree in Civil Action No.
2388 was duly and regularly entered, is not void
on its face, and is a valid decree for all purposes,
and this Court is without jurisdiction to set aside
the same.
5. That the plaintiffs, and each and all of
them, whether denominated as plaintiffs or crossdefendants, are entitled to a Decree and J udgInent of this Court quieting their and each of
their title against all clain1s, demands or pretentions of the defendant and cross-complainant,
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CULBERT L. OLSON, as set forth in the findings of fact herein, and a:ll persons claiming or
to claim the hereinafter described real property
or any part thereof, through or under said defendant and cross-complainant, and that all of them
be perpetually estopped fron1 setting up any
claims thereto, or any part thereof.
6. That the plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment against the said defendant and cross-complainant, CULBERT L. OLSON, for their costs
expended herein.
That the property herein mentioned is situated in Uintah County, State of Utah, and is described as follows, t~wit:

Township 1 South of Range
Uintah 8 pecial Meridian.
Section 34: Ny2 SW1_4

1

West of the

Dated this 4th day of June, A.D., 1951.
(s) JOSEPH E. NELSON
Judge"
Appellant served and filed Objections and Proposed
Amendments to the Findings to embrace parts of the
record hereinabove related (R.277 -83) and filed a statement in support of his Objections and Proposed Amendments, \vhich were made a part of the record at the
hearing thereof which reads as follows (R. 286-94):
APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS

THE RECORD shows that: This action
was commenced by plaintiffs in August, 1948;
Defendant, CULBERT L. OLSON, was not
served until September 16, 1949, when he received
personal service of summons and complaint at
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910 Stock Exc.hange Building, 639 South Spring
Street, Los Angeles 14, California; that defendant duly filed his original answer admitting that
he clain1ed ownership of the land involved, adverse to the claims of plaintiffs, denying the
contrary allegations of the complaint and praying
that his title to said land be quieted. That on
September 19, 1949, defendant communicated with
plaintiffs counsel, George B. Stanley, asking why
plaintiffs were claiming this land against him.

It was not until December 29, 1949, that defendant received in response to this inquiry an abstract of title with the following letter from
George B. Stanley, attorney for plaintiffs, dated
December 14, 1949, which was read to the Court
at its hearing of plaintiffs first motion for summary judgment on May 9, 1950 (see letter quoted
verbatim, page 4.)
"That defendant was afflicted with influenza
and was confined to bed at about the time of
receiving said abstract of title (see affidavit filed
January 5, 1950) ; that it was not until on or
about January 5, 1950, that defendant discovered
the reference in said abstract to a judgment in
a case described in said abstract as that of J.
PARRY BOWDEN or J. PARRY BOWN v.
CULBERT L. OLSON, to which no reference wa~
made by plaintiff's counsel as a ground for their
claim of title to said land.
"That defendant filed his original cross-complaint herein to quiet his title against Plaintiff
J. PARRY BOWEN describing him as also known
as J. PARRY BOWDEN and J. PARRY BOWN
believing and alleging that the J. PARRY BOWSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
DEN and J. PARRY BOWN referred to is the
same person as J. PARRY BOWEN in this case.
"That on March 27, 1950, defendant and
cross-complainant served and filed his first
Amended Cross-complaint specifically attacking
said judgment as being void.
"That on April 3rd, 1950, as shown by a
transcripts of record of a hearing before the
Court on that date, a copy of which is set forth
in defendant and cross-complainant's Objections
and Proposed Amendments to the Court's Findings, heretofore duly presented to said Court,
counsel for plaintiff and cross-defendant admitted
in open Court on that date that he 1nay have gone
too far in stating to defendant prior thereto that
plaintiff would make no claim under said judgInent; and counsel also stated to the Court that:
•\Ve are not taking that (judgment) too seriously,
I don't think we will press it.'
"Counsel for plaintiff and cross-defendant
also then stipulated that the tax deed to the
County and the tax deed from the County to
Burns Hallett and the deed fron1 Burns Hallett
to J. PARRY BOWEN shown in the abstract of
title to which the findings refer are invalid as
conveyances of any title to said land. Therefore,
it is admitted that the l~gal record title to said
land is in defendant and cross-complainant as
shown by said abstract of title, yet the Court's
Fndings make no mention of these facts and
stipulations.
"That defendant and cross-complainant made
an offer of proof on May 9th, 1950, as shown in
the reporters transcript on file, before the Court
. ruled on a previous motion for summary judg-
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1nent denying the smue whic.h offer of proof
not included in the Court's findings.

i~

··After ~tating a c.onclusion of law as a 'finding of facf that 'the said dec.ree in said Civil
Action No. 2:~ss is not void on it's face' the Court
makes the following amazing as it's finding number 11:
"11. That the cross-cmnplaint amending and
replacing his third amended cross-complaint made
by Culbert L. Olson does not allege that said
decree in said civil ac.tion No. 2388 is void on it'8
face and attacks the said decree on the ground
of fraud."
"This seen1~ to ilnply that the judgment i:-;
void on it's face but nevertheless is res adjudicata
bec.ause the cross-c01nplaint does not use the
words "on it's face". But the cross complaint
does attack the judgn1ent as being void both on
it's face and also for the reasons given that it
was obtained by fraud. Paragraph 3 says: 'Cross
complainant alleges that said default judgment
is void, and c.ross c.omplainant claims the right to
have the same vacated as null and void because
and by reason of the following fac.ts', and goes
on to show that the judgment is void both on it's
face as well as having been scured by fraud.
Paragraph 3 (b) of the cross complaint shows
specifically why the judgment is void on it's face.
The affidavit for publication of summons ts, or
was then, a part of the Judgment Roll.
Finding number 9 says:
"Defendant and cross complainant Culbert
L. Olson Inade no attack on the validity of the said
decree in Civil action number 2388 until the filing
herein of his first amended cross complaint on
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:March 31, 1950, more than three months after
receiving the abstract of title mentioned in paragraph 7 of these findings, and more than three
years after the entry and recording of the said
decree". But as heretofore shown, no mention is
made of the record showing that defendant and
cross compainant was led by counsel for plaintiffs
and cross defendants to believe that they would
not rely on that decree and would not oppose it's
being vacated when brought to the attention of
the Court; that because of it's invalidity the present action was brought; and the allegation of the
cross complaint with reference to that matter are
disregarded in the findings.
"However, since another of the Court's conclusions of Law is that 'the cause of action in
said cross-complaint to set aside the decree in
Civil Action 2388 is barred b ythe provisions of
Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure', it
would not alter that erroneous conclusion if the
cross complaint had been filed one day after three
n1onths had expired from the date the decree was
entered, furthermore the provisions of that rule
as to time refers only to rnotions for relief made
in the case itself.
"This rule does not limit the power of the
Court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon
the Court". (Rule 60(b) ).
"Defendants' original answer to the complaint, filed when served with summons and complaint, asserted his right to the land against all
clai1ns of the plaintiff and asks for judgment
against J. Parry Bowen, et al., plaintiffs in this
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case, quieting defendants title to the land in question whatever 1night be the nature of their claims,
whether based upon an invalid tax title, an invalid decree or other false claims. So also did
defendants• original c.ross complaint filed herein
on or about the 6th day of January, 1950.
It is true that in his original attac.ks on all
clain1s of plaintiffs to said land, no speeific mention was n1ade of the invalid decree in civil action
2388 aftr defendant learned of the smne following receipt of the abstract of title until the
serring and filing of his first amended crosscomplaint on March 27th, 1950, because he was
led to believe, as heretofore stated, that plaintiffs
did not rely upon said judgment and would not
resist its' being vacated.
"Notwithstanding this record, the Court has
accepted and signed a finding that "the defendant
and cross complainant, Culbert L. Olson, is guilty.
of laches in the premises".
"What possible disadvantage to plaintiffs and
cross-defendants can be found in the fact that
defendant and cross-complainant did not refer
to the judgment in case No. 2388 in the assertion
in his answer and cross-complaint filed prior to
the filming of his first amended cross-complaint
of his right and title to the property as against the
claims of plaintiffs and cross-defendants? No
laches of defendant and cross-complainant can
be truthfully and legally found in the case.
"If one were looking for laches or unreasonable delays in this case, reference might be made
to the following record:
"1. Plaintiffs failed to serve defendant Culbert L. Olson with summons and complaint herein
for a period of thirteen months from the date
the complaint was filed.
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"2. On May 29, 1950, following the disposition of motions made by plaintiffs, issues were
finally joined upon the complaint as to defendant
Culbert L~ Olson, defendants amended answer
thereto, the cross-complaint of defendant amending and replacing his third amended cross-complaint, cross-defendants answer thereto, and
cross-complainants answer to the cross claim contained in said cross-defendants answer. On that
date defendant and cross-complainant filed a request for trial on the first available date and
gave notice thereof. No trial date was fixed by
the Court pursuant to said notice.
"3. On June 30, 1950, plaintiffs and crossdefendants served a second motion for summary
judgment and noticed it for hearing on July
14, 1950.
''4. Said second motion for summary judgment was not heard by the court until September
11, 1950, when it was argued and submitted to the
Court for its ruling.
"5. The Court made no ruling on this second
motion for summary judgment until January 25,
1951, when it made a minute order granting said
motion. Rule 56 (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides; 'that the (summary) judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issues as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
n1atter of law."
"6. No notice was given to defendant and
cross-complainant of the court's ruling on said
motion and defendant and cross-complainant had
no knowledge thereof until nearly a month had
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elapsed since said ruling was n1ade and upon
inquiry of Judge Nelson ascertained front him
that he had ruled on the 1i1otion on January
25, 1951.
"7. K o judgment was entered pursuant to
said ruling.
"8. Defendant and cross-complainant again
on April 20, 1951, conununicated with Judge Nelson asking that formal judgment be entered from
which an appeal would lie and subtnitted a formal
judgment in accordance with his ruling for that
purpose.
"9. Judge Nelson answered this request on
April 2:3, 1951, sa~ing: 'I have this day talked
with George Stanley, attorney for l\fr Bowen,
who stated that he prepared findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree inthis matter and that
the satne would reach 1ne within two days. I
shall withhold the signing of the judgment you
have prepared until I have had an opportunity to
examine the papers he is sending. Will advise
you further in the matter within the next
few days."
"But defendant and cross-complainant received no further advice from Judge Nelson.
Defendant and cross-complainant received a letter dated May 4, 1951, from George B. Stanley,
attorney for plaintiffs and cross-defendants in
which he stated: 'I have been reluctant to bring
the reasons for the delay, (in submitting findings
and judgment), to the attention of the Judge and
also to offer it as an alibi for not filing finding-~.
conclusions and decree before.'
"With that letter Mr. Stanley enclosed a copy
of a letter he wrote Judge Nelson dated :May 4,
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1951, in which he states: "J. Parry Bowen, one
of the plaintiffs, died November 30th, 1950, Petition for letter of administration were filed December 22, 1950, by his widow with Hugh W. Colton
as attorney. The order appointing the administratrix January 12, 1951. The bond of the
administratrix was filed l\farch 24, 1951." The
letter further states that it was his understanding
that no further proceedings can be had until the
personal representative has been appointed and
qualified: that just as soon as letters of administration have been filed with the clerk, the proposed findings, conclusions and decree will be
forwarded to Judge Nelson and served upon
Culbert L. Olson.
"10. Proposed findings, conclusions and decree prepared by counsel for plaintiffs and crossdefendants were not served on defendant and
cross-complainant until July 7, 1951, when a copy
thereof purported to be signed by Judge Nelson
under date of June 4, 1951, was delivered to
Clyde S. Johnson of counsel for defendant and
cross-complainant and said findings, conclusions
and judgment were on that date filed in the clerks
office and the judg1nent was entered.
"The Courts' conclusion of law that the crosscomplaint of defendant Culbert L. Olson
amending and replacing the third amended crosscomplaint 'is a mere collateral attack upon the
judgment in civil action No. 2388 in this Court'
is shown to be erroneous under the authorities
cited in the brief submitted to the Court by
defendant and cross-complainant on September
11, 1950, at the time of the hearing of the motion
for summary judgment, to which may be added
reference to Rule 13(a), (b) and (f) of Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure which allow for any
clailn against plaintiff~.

ero~~

"Defendant and cross-emnplainant here repeats the contention 1nade in his eo1n1nunication
under date of l\lay 10, 1951, to Judge Nelson in
which he stated that the 1naking of findings of fact
and conclusions of law are not only not required
but are in1proper and tmneeessary to the entry of
a su1nmary judg~nent; that a finding and conclusion 'that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the nwving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' upon the
entire record is implicit in granting of a motion
for a sUininary judg~nent. (Rules 56( c) and 52( a)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
'"'VE RESPECTFULLY SUBl\IIT, that

"1. No findings and conclusions should be
made inas1nuch as the whole record in the case
must be reviewed to determine whether there is
a genuine issue to be tried.
"2. The findings signed and filed are incomplete and erroneous as hereinbefore shown, and
if findings are to remain amend1nents thereto as
proposed by defendant and eross-complainant
should be n1ade.

"3. The Courts' conclusions of law a·re erroneous and the judgment is against law."
Appellants objections and proposed a1nendments to
said findings and conclusions were overruled and denied.
(Trans proc. July 27, 1951. R. 301-15).
JUDGMENT ROLL IN CIVIL ACTION 2388

In addition to the allegations of appellant's said
cross-complaint amending and replaeing his Third
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Amended Cross-complaint re the judgment roll in Civil
Action 2388 which are admitted in respondent's answer
thereto, we quote here in full the affidavit for publication
of summons and the Clerk's order for such publication.
(File in Action 2388, Exhibit.)
AFFIDAVIT FOR PUBLICATION OF SUMMONS

"Hugh "\V. Colton, being first duly sworn,
deposes and says: That he is the attorney for
the plaintiff in the above entitled action.
That on the 11th day of September, A.D.,
1946, the said plaintiff caused a verified Complaint to be filed in said action, alleging that the
defendant Culbert L. Olson, claims to have some
interest in and to the premises described therein
adverse to the estate and interest of the said plaintiff, and praying that the defendant be compelled
to show his said claim and it be determined to be
null and void as against the said plaintiff, and
that the defendant be forever barred and precluded from all right, title and interest in and
to said premises and each and every part thereof.
"That the defendant, Culbert L. Olson, resides outside the State of Utah, and person service thereon cannot be had."
"That this action is brought to quiet title tD
land within this countv as described in the Complaint which is referred to and by adoption, made
a part hereof. That affiant, for the purpose of
finding said defendant, has made diligent search
and inquiry in the State of Utah, and has checked
the records of both to detern1ine the last address
of the defendant, and finds that his last address
was:
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Culbert L. Olson-Pnknown
Affiant therefore states that personal service
cannot be had and prays that service of SmnInons be had by publication in the Vernal Express,
a newspaper in Uintah County State of Utah,
wherein the land is located.
(s) Hugh''"'"· Colton
Subscribed and sworn to before 1ne this 11th
day of Sept. 1946.
( s) F. L. Noel, Uintah County Clerk
Notary Public
Residing at Vernal, Utah
(No seal 1na.de)
FILED : Septe1nber 11, 1946."
ORDER FOR PUBLICATION

•·It satisfactorily appearing from the Affidavit of Hugh W. Colton that the above entitled
action relates to real property in this State, in
which the defendant herein claims or makes clain1
and interest, actual or contingent, and that the
relief sought in said action consists wholly in
excluding the defendant herein fron1 any interest
in or lien upon said real property; and it appearing that the defendant named in said Affidavit
resides outside the State of Utah and cannot,
after due diligence be found within this State, and
that he does not have an office or process agent
residing within the State of Utah, and that his
place of residence is outside the State of Utah
and personal service thereon cannot be had.
"NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered
that the service of Sunrmons upon the said defendant be made by publication in the Vernal
Express a newspaper of general circulation
printed and published in the County of Uintah,
State of Ctah, which publication shall be at least
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once a week for five successive weeks.
Dated this 11th day of September, A.D. 1946.
(s) F. L. Noel, Clerk
FILED: September 11, 1946."
Because the record on appeal consists of all the
pleadings, original papers and transcripts of proceedings
in the Court below, Appellant has quoted at length from
the pleadings and record of proceedings in the belief
that it will serve the convenience of this Court in its
consideration of this appeal. If appellant has overlooked
the inclusion of any essential part of the record before
the Court below appellant invites its supplementation
by respondents.
POINTS ON WHICH APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY
FOR A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE
COURT BELOW

(Directed to the grounds alleged in respondents
1notion and accepted by the lower court as its "Findings
of fact and conclusion of law.")
POINT I
THE JUDGEMENT IN CIVIL ACTION NO. 2388 IS
VOID ON ITS FACE.
POINT 2
THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL ACTION NO. 2388 WAS
OBTAINED BY FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
POINT 3
APPELLANT'S CROSS-COMPLAINT IS A DIRECT ATTACK ON SAID JUDGMENT. IT IS COMPULSORY UNDER
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RULE 13(a) AND WOULD BE PERMISSIVE UNDER RULE
13 (b) OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1950, IF

IT COULD BE CONSIDERED A COLLATERAD ATTACK
UNDER PREVIOUS UTAH STATUTES AND DECISIONAL
LAW.
POINT 4
THE CAUSE OF ACTION SET FORTH IN APPELLANT'S CROSS-COMPLAINT IS:
A.

NOT BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF RULE
UTAH RULES OF

B.

60 (b) OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1950;

APPELLANT IS NOT GUILTY OF LACHES IN THE PREMISES
AND HIS CROSS-COMPLAINT CANNOT BE BARRED ON THAT
GROUND.

POINT 5

ffi

THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DISPROVES THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT IN ACTION NO. 2388,
AND PROVES CONCLUSIVELY THAT APPELLANT HAS
A MERITORIUS DEFENSE THERETO AS WELL AS TO
RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT IN THIS SECOND ACTION.
POINT 6

;;_.

THAT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM
IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY RULE 56 OF UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND VIOLATES ITS EXPRESS PROVISIONS.
POINT 7

~:

THAT SAID SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENIES APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL ACTION NO. 2388
IS VOID ON ITS FACE
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The court's assertion in its decree in Action No.
2388 that the defendant was duly served with a Summons
and that his default for failure to appear had been duly
entered is shown to be untrue on the face of the judgment roll of which the affidavit and order for publication
of Summons based thereon constitute the vital part and
basis for granting said default decree.
The affidavit and order in said action are as much
a part of the judgment roll as is the default decree.
(Utah Code Ann. 1943, 104-30-14).
As stated in appellant's cross-complaint, the affidavit to support the order for publication of summons
and the default decree is wholly insufficient:
"In that it did not state probatory or evidentiary facts frmn which a judge or clerk of said
court could determine that the place of residence
of the defendant was unknown, that said affidavit
does not state that the place of residence of defendant was unknown to plaintiff or to his attor:.
ney who made said affidavit, that said affidavit
does not contain probative or evidentiary facts
frmn which it could be determined by a judge or
clerk of said court that any effort was made by
pmiuLlff or the affiant in said affidavit to ascertain
the place of residence of the defendant; that said
affidavit does not contain probative or evidentiary
facts from which a judge or clerk of said court
could determine what, if any, diligence was used
by said affiant in his alleged 'diligent search and
inquiry in the State of Utah for the purpose of
finding the defendant', or in what record or where
the affiant found, as stated in his affidavit, that
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the defendant's last known address was 'Culbert
L. Olson-unknown.''
If there has ever been a more insufficient and equivocal affidavit for publication of smnmons to avoid
personal service on a defendant an1ong all such affidavits
that have been held insufficient to support an order for
publication of surmnons in the State of Utah or else"There, appellant has been lmable to find it.
~lfter

stating that "defendant Culbert L. Olson
resides outside of the State of Utah, and person service
(presmnably for that reason) thereon cannot be had
thereon" the affidavit states ·'that affiant, for the purpose
of finding said defendant has made diligent search and
inquiry (to find hiln) in the State of Utah, and has
checked the records of both (both of what and wha.t
records J) to determine the last address of the defendant,
and finds that his last address was: Culbert L. Olsonunknown."
\Vhat records did affiant check to find an address
where none is given~ What record did affiant find in
the State of r tah where the nan1e Culbert L. Olson is
followed by the word "unknown"~ The affiant signifi<·antly does not state what records he "checked". The
affidavjt does not state that either the plaintiff or his
attorney making the affidavit did not know appellant's
place of residence outside the State of utah.
The entire affidavit is meaningless beyond the statement that defendant resides outside of the State of
rtah, which statement affiant made of his own knowlSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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edge, but he did not give defendant's place of residence
outside the State of Utah, which he must also have
known of his own knowledge, in connection with his own
knowledge that "defendant resides outside of the State.'·
How did the affiant know that? He does not say in order
not to expose the fact that he knew appellant's place of
residence outside of the state.
From affiant's statement of the foregoing conclusion as to his diligence-without one single supporting
fact-the trial court nevertheless concludes that the default judgment rendered thereon is not void but in res
adjudicata. Perhaps the court below mistakenly believes
that a failure to set forth the facts constituting "diligence" is a mere defect of process like a misspelled word.
But the judgment is void on its face because the affidavit
without which no due process or valid default judgment
could be procured is fatally insufficient, in that no facts
are stated in proof that any effort at all was made to
locate appellant or his place· of residence. Affiant could
not have been diligent because the record shows his
lack of diligence. Affiant's omission to swear to any fact
from which it 1night be reasonably inferred that he exercised any diligence at all to "find" appellant is as fatal
to the order based thereon for publication of summons
and to the resultant judgment as though no affidavit
at all had been sworn to or filed in the action. Without
swearing to facts the state1nent can swear to nothing.
The affidavit cannot be its own interpreter and thus
deprive the court or clerk of their respective

dutie~
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toward it. The imperative duties imposed by statute
to expedite service of process on non-residents must be
legally discharged, in the absence of which the foundation of the court's jurisdiction is destroyed. There cannot be a valid default judgment res adjudicata of a
non-resident's property rights founded upon a void service of process.
The mere self-serving statement that due, diligence
has been exercised does not constitute proof of the prerequisite jurisdictional fact. It is not sufficient to merely
state a legal conclusion in the language or form prescribed in the Statute-to say in effect "I have used
due diligence. The non-resident's whereabouts is unknown." That statement might be made by anyone without any effort or without making the slightest inquiry
to ascertain the whereabouts of a non-resident owner
of real property. Probative and evidentiary facts showing diligence (if diligence means what it implies and is
defined as meaning) must be set forth in the body of
the affidavit so that the court will be informed and the
record will show what, if any, diligence was exercised,
and whether an effort was seriously and in good faith
made calculated to locate and inform the non-resident
defendant of an action against him or his property.
~l

default judgment based upon such a fictitious and
nonsensical affidavit for service by publication instead
of by personal service is only a purported judgment,
void on its face, for neither the· clerk's order for publication nor the court's decree following such void proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cess gave the court jurisdiction to enter a valid judg;
ment.
Leibhardt v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 P.
215.
In re Waters Estate (1941), 100 etah 246,
251, 113 P. 2nd 1038.
Counsel for respondents doubtless agreed with appellant or they certainly would not have brought this
second action in an attempt to secure a valid judg1nent
against appellant to quiet the same plaintiff's alleged
title to the same land. Respondents in bringing this
second action and their counsel admitted as n1uch, as is
shown by the record. (State1nent of Facts, page 6).
A judg1nent is held void where it is based on substituted or constructive service, or service by publication which is not made in strict compliance with tlw
essential statutory requirements relating thereto in
numerous cases cited in:
49 Corpus Juris 63.
A judgment based on service by publication
is void where the requirements of the statute are
not complied ~rith, with respect to the affida.vit
for the order of publication.
Butler v. ~fcKay, C.C.A. Cal. 138 F'. (2d) 373,
certiorari denied 64 S. Ct. 636, 321 U.S. 780,
88 L. Ed. 1073.
Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Schmidt. 126
P. (2d) 1036, 109 Colo. 467.
Robbins v. Lincoln ~rrace Christian Church,
75 P. (2d) 874, 181 Okla. 615.
Morgan v. Stevens, 223 P. 365, 101 Okla. 116.
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Laughlin v. Hughes, 89 P. (2d) 568, 161 Or.
295.
Ray v. Pilot Fire Ins. Co., 121 F.E. 779.
In order to support a default judgrnent, the defendant must be served with due process or voluntarily
appear.
Glidden v. Pa.cka.rd, 28 Cal. 649.
Street v. Dexter, 77 P. (2d) 707 (Okla.)
Yutziz v. Hope, 158 P. (2d) 110.
Okanogan State Bank v. Thompson, 211 P.
993, 106 Or 447.
If defendant is not sen·ed a default judgment taken
against him is void·

State Tax Com. v. Larsen, 100 Ut. 303, 110 P.
(2nd) 558.
Peterson v. Hutton, 284 P. 279, 132 Or. 252.
And the same is true where the service on the defendant is radically defective:
Wilson v. Superior Court, 54 P. (2d) 539, 11
Cal. A pp. (2d) 643.
A judgment based upon constructive service upon a
non-resident is void if the method of attempted notice
to defendant is insufficient to constitute due process.

Standish v. Standish, 40 N.Y.S. (2d) 538:
"If the record on the whole shows what was
done to acquire jurisdiction was insufficient, it
will not be presumed that some other thing, not
~hown hy the record, which would confer jurisdiction was done, the whole record being taken
together for this purpose."
21 C.J.S. p.156.
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Where it appears ·from the record that the court
was without jurisdiction, no presumption of jurisdiction can be indulged, and the action of the court is void.
21 t.J.S. p. 156, citing inter alia.
Adolph v. Schwartz, 296 P. 508, 112 Cal. App.
781.

"So, the record of a court of general jurisdiction reciting that defendant has been duly
served with process rnay be overthrown by other
portions of the record of equal dignity showing
that such recital is untrue." 21 C.J.S. pp. 4-14445.
"The very reason for the affidavit is to make
sure that every reasonable diligence to ascertain
the whereabouts of the defendant has been made.
If diligence or good faith in endeavoring to ascertain the defendant's whereabouts is not employed.
or if sufficient facts are not shown in the affidavit fron1 which it can be inferred that such
diligence and good faith were ernployed, the judgment is void on its face." (Justice Wolfe in 97
Ut. 407.)
For the foregoing reasons appellant respectfully
submits that said default judgment in Civil Action No.
2388 is void on its face; that the contrary holding of

the court belo,v, together with its ruling that the same
court and the same judge who granted the former judgrnent is without jurisdiction to set it aside, is

again~t

law.
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POINT II.
THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 2388
WAS OBTAINED BY FRAUD UPON THE COURT.

The default judgment is not only void on its face,
and for that reason constituted a fraud upon the court,
but it is also shown by the allegations of fact set forth
in appellant's cross-con1plaint (which are necessarily
admitted by respondent's motion for summary judgment) that said judgment was obtained by fraud upon
the court and its processes and upon appellant.
The proof of this fraud, in addition to the face of
the record with its earmarks of fraud already shown,
is that the order for publication of sum1nons was pro~
cured by a wilfully false and fraudulent affidavit for
the purpose of preventin-g appellant from knowing of
the existence of said action and fron1 appearing therein
and defending his title to his land.
That affidavit is wilfully false and misleading, and
fraudulent, in that it states:

''Person service thereon (Summons) cannot
be had-that affiant, for the purpose of finding
said defendant, has made diligent search and
inquiry in the State of Utah, and has checked the
records of both to determine the last address of
the defendant, and finds that his last address
was: Culbert L. Olson-unknown."
Now here did the affiant in said affidavit find in
any records in the State of Utah that appellant's last
known address was given as "ttnknown."
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At the time when the first action was prepared and
filed the plaintiff and his attorney, who swore to the
false statement in the affidavit, as well as the clerk of
the court, had convenient 1neans of knowing the place
of residence and the exact postoffice address of appellant. The assessment rolls in the offices of the County
Assessor and County Treasurer of Uintah County, next
door to the office of the Clerk, showed plainly, with
reference to the record title and assessment and payment
of taxes on said land, both appellant's name and his
exact postoffice address in the City of Los Angeles,
State of California, the same as that published in the
telephone and city directories of Los Angeles since 1929
and prior thereto.
Appellant since 1901 has been, and still is, a member
of the Bar of Utah; and since prior to 1925 he has been
and still is a member of the Bar of California.
Appellant was a member of the Utah State Senate
from January 1917 to January 1921, and was a member
of the California State Senate from January 1935 to
January 1939; and in 1938 appellant was elected Governor of California and remained Governor for four
years (January 1939-January 1943). This fact was
widely published in the daily and weekly newspapers
of Utah, including daily papers of wide circulation in
Uintah County, and appellant's place of residence wa~
known to the affiant when in his affidavit he swore that
the whereabouts of Culbert L. Olson was "unknown."
Independent of the records of Uintah County, any
good faith inquiry by any person seeking service of
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summons on appellant would have readily disclosed his
exact place of residence and his exact postoffice address.
The plaintiff, in Action No. 2388, and his attorney who
made the affidavit, (in ascertaining their own reasons
for bringing the first action), must have known appellant's place of residence and must have ascertained his
exact postoffice address, just as respondent's attorneys
knew it in bringing this second action and making personal service on appellant at his same postoffice address
in Los Angeles.
Plaintiff's attorney in the first action was careful
not to place the summons in the hands of the sheriff
or of anyone else for the purpose of ascertaining appellant's place of residence, or for the purpose of making
a return thereon. He was careful not to make inquiry
of any person in public or private life in or outside of
the State of Utah; and, if he did so, he suppressed
giving the name of the person or persons of whom he
made inquiry, or of the person or persons' response to
his inquiry. The affiant was careful not to mention in
his affidavit what "diligent search and inquiry" he made;
and he was careful not to mention what record he "checked" ; and, of course, he was careful not to mention in his
affidavit the fact that he, himself, knew appellant's place
of residence without making any inquiry.
These indisputable facts (admitted by respondent's
motion for summary judgment) constitute a fraud upon
the court through the abuse of its judicial processes; a
fraud perpetrated for the single and sole purpose of
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ing certain that appellant would not be personally served
with summons.
Intent to deceive is usually proved by inference,
rather than by direct evidence :
Bell v. Graham (Cal.), 105 A.C.A. 938, 234
P. (2d) 158.

As the court moderately stated the point in Liebhardt v. Lawrence, supra (Utah, p. 262):
"Upon the evidence, we do not say that the
conduct of the defendant was such as to prevent
notice to the plaintiff of the prior proceeding.
But his conduct is more in harmony with that
theory than with that of reasonable efforts to
give plaintiff such notice."
Had the court in the first proceeding been fully
advised in the premises of the facts set forth in appellant's cross-complaint herein it must be assumed that the
court would not have assumed jurisdiction to enter a
default judgment against appellant without due process.
For it is well established that:

"* * * in a civil case a court will not take
jurisdiction based on a service of process on a
defendant who was brought within the reach of
its process wrongfully or fraudulently, or by
deceit, or by any other improper device.''
21 Corpus Juris Sec., Sect. 83, p. 124.
See: Wyman v. Newhouse, C.C.A., N.Y. 93
F. (2d) 313, 115 A.L.R. 460, certiorari denied
58 S. Ct. 831, 303 U.S. 664, 82 L. Ed. 1122.
Nicholson v. Gulf Mobile & Northern Rly.
Co., 172 So. 306, 308, quoting Corpus Juri~.
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To paraphrase this Court's language in In Re

Waters, (1941) 100 Utah 246, which is so apt and significantly identical on principle to this case that the crosscomplaint herein is good as against a n1otion for summary judgment (a demurrer in Waters case) : "It is
obvious * * * that the facts set forth therein are sufficient to show that the court acquired ho jurisdiction"
to grant_ the decree quieting title'. ··If it lacked jurisdiction, the decree was a nullity."
If the judgment's voidness is not self-revealed as
appellant contends it is under Point I, appellant's pleadings set out exactly and with particularity wherein the
judgment is void as a fraud upon the court, satisfying
every requirement pronounced and followed by this
Honorable Court in numerous decisions.

Liebhardt v. Lawrence, 40 Ut. 243; 120 P.
215;
Intermill v. Nash, 94Ft. :271, 75 P. (:Zd) 161;
In re Waters, supra;
I

~'

Weyant et al v. Utah Savings & Trust Co.,
54 l~tah 181, at 201, 205, 212; 182 P. 189.
In the Weyant case, supra, this Court said :
.. \Ve are presented with a case, therefore,
where the fraud is not only extrinsic, but where
it operated directly upon the court as well as upon the respondents; that is, the administratrix
merely used the court as an Instrumentality by
1ueans of which she gained her end, namely, to
acquire the property belonging to respondents
through legal forms."
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The facts stated in appellant's cross-complaint constitutes an obvious fraud upon the court. It would be
needless to argue or labor the point were it not for the
lower court's apparent misconception of it.
The mere typing of the affidavit for the order for
publication of sumn1ons is not the fraud. The fraud i~
swearing falsely and stating as a conclusion what i:demonstrably false, and therefore no evidentiary and
probative facts supporting it; so that there is nothing
upon which a court or its clerk can act in compliance
with the Statute relating to service of summons on a
non-resident defendant
There is a reason for the insufficiency and inherent
falseness of the affidavit. There is a reason for the omission of evidentiary and probative facts to show "diligence." The reason is-and appellant has sworn to the
fact in his pleadings and offered to prove it-that the
affiant knew where appellant was and where he could be
mailed a copy of the summons and con1plaint. Certainly
the withholding of this knowledge to avoid a personal
service on appellant must be held to be a fraud upon the
court.
POINT III.
APPELLANT'S CROSS-COMPLAINT IS A DIRECT ATTACK ON THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN CIVIL ACTION
NO. 2388.
A.
APPELLANT'S ATTACK ON THE JUDGEMENT IS COMPULSORY
UNDER RULE

13 (a) AND WOULD BE PERMISSIVE UNDER RULE 13 (b),
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U.R.C.P., IF IT COULD BE CONSIDERED AS A COLLATERAL ATTACK
UNDER ANY PREVIOUS UTAH STATUTE OR DECISION.

In bringing this second action to quiet title against
appellant, this time by due process of law, and by deciding not to stipulate to the invalidity of the prior default
judgment as proof of alleged title, respondents raised
that issue in the case and introduced into evidence the
judgment roll in the fonner action on the strength of
which they n1oved for sumn1ary judginent on the ground
accepted by the court, that appellant's cross-complaint
is a "mere collateral attack" on said judgment.
Before showing, under the decisions of this Court
prior to the effective date of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, (Jan. 1, 1950), that appellant's cross-complaint would not be held to be a collateral attack on the
judgment, but a direct attack, the question as to whether
under the new rules it makes any difference whether a
cross-claim attacking a judgment is in form a direct or
collateral attack.
Rule ·13 (b) provides:

''Permissive Counterclaim. A pleading ma.y
state as a counter-claim any clai1n against an
opposing party not arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject Inatter of the
opposing party's claim."
The Note to Rule 13 (b) states that this new rule
contains a broader provision than the Utah Code 104-9:2 defining a counter-claim.
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Rule 13 (a) defining compulsory co'ltnter-claim provides:
~'A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading
the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction," etc.

Under either of the foregoing applicable rules of
pleading, the distinction drawn between a direct and
a collateral attack on a judgment would appear to be
abolished as to form at least.
Any claim against an opposing party may be set up
by way of a counterclaim whether or not it arises out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim of title. That must include
the claim against the opposing party in this action to
have the prior judg1nent declared void in whatever form
the same 1nay be pleaded.
Appellant shall proceed, however, to consider the
ground stated in respondent's motion for sumn1ary judgment that appellant's cross cmnplaint must be disregarded as a collateral attack on the judgment, as though
the motion had been made prior to the adoption of these
new rules of procedure.
B.
APPELLANT'S ATTACK UPON THE PRIOR JUDGMENT IS PROVEN
TO HAVE BEEN DIRECT BY RESPONDENTS' MOTION AND THE COURT'S
RULING THEREON.
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Appellant's cross-cmnplaint seeks to annul or obliterate the prior default judgrnent for the reasons hereinbefore stated under Points I and II. The object and
clear purpose of this pleading is to seek relief fron1 a
void judgment obtained by fraud and withuot due proeess. It cannot be classified as a n1ere atternpt to avoid
the incidental effect of the judgment, because if it were
a valid judgn1ent. the issue of title would be foreclosed.
To hold that the prior judg1nent bec~une involved in this
case only incidentally in consequence of which appellant's cross-complaint is a m~re collateral attack contradicts the trial court's judgn1ent which reposes on this
untenable ground. Nevertheless, the trial court accepted
fully respondents' specious argument in their brief in
support of their n1otion wherein they said that appellant's cross-con1plaint "is only incidental to his request
that his title be quieted in this action against plaintiffs,"
which inaccurate statement of fact and law is contrary
to the Court's definition of a collateral attack in the
lntermill case, supra, where a collateral attack is defined
as one in which :
"The judgment is or becon1es involved in the
cause, only incidentally and collaterally and its
enforcPJncnt or ralidity is not the primary issue
in and impelling 1mrpose of the proceeding."

( En1phasis adcied.)
The trial court's granting of respondents' n1otion
for summary judgment conclusively proves that the
enforcement of the forn1er default judgment and its
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validity was not only the primary issue in the case but
became the only issue in the trial court's opinion. Respondents' pleadings clairn title by virtue of said judgment, and respondents' motion, followed by their introduction of the judginent roll in the former action into
evidence conclusively demonstrates that their "impelling
purpose" in this case is to establish the alleged validity
of the prior judgment and enforce it.
Respondents, in their brief in support of their motion, stated :
"This present action was not brought for the
primary object of modifying, setting aside, cancelling or vacating, or enjoining the enforcement
of the judgment. It was brought originally as an
action to quiet title."
To which respondents shmtld have added:
"In reliance upon the former default decree
which is conclusive of all issues of title, provided
it is not void."
The summary judgment granted by the lower court
in response to respondents' motion is undeniably an adjudication that there were no other issues to be tried
and that the validity of the prior judgment is the primary issue. Appellant's cross complaint attacking that
judgment cannot, therefore, be a collateral attack under
the law of Utah. To quote Justice Wolfe in the Intermill
case:
··~' ~, * 'Ye are interested rnore in the m~nner
of testing in any given case whether a judgment
may be attacked than in nomenclature * * *"
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c.
APPELLANT'S CROSS·COMPLAINT CONSTITUTES A DIRECT ATTACK
0~

THE PRIOR DEFAULT DECREE AS A MATTER OF LAW AND EQUITY.

As a matter of law, appellant refers to Justice
\\rolfe's concurring opinion in the case of lntermill v.
Nash, supra, which would seem to be in accord with
Rules 13 (a) and (b) U.R.C.P., hereinabove referred to:
.. As, says the prevailing opinion, generally
a direct attack is one, the purpose of which is to
eli1ninate what is or purports to be a judgment,
whereas a collateral attack atten1pts, not to obliterate a judg~nent, but to avoid the effect of it
when used in another suit. But I think there is
a form of direct attack which really only avoids
the effect of a purported jttdgment. In order to
make this 1nore clear, I list the types of direct attacks as I see then1 :
"(1) That attack which atten1pts to set
aside a judgment by motion or proceeding
brought in the ~ame suit in which the judgment
was rendered.
"(:Z) A (separate) suit brought and designed directly to set aside a voidable judgment
or what is not a judgment but which purports to
be one in other words, a void judgment .

.. ( 3) Where a party brings a suit or defends a suit relying for recovery or for a defense
on what purports to be a judgment rendered in
another suit, the opposing party 1nay show such
judgment to ve void.
"If one brings a suit on a contract, the other
party may show the contract invalid. For the
same reason, I see no reason why, in a suit based
on a purported judg1nent or defended on the
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strength of a supposed judgment which is null,
it may not be avoided in the same suit in which
such judg1nent is to be introduced and used by
laying the proper foundation for introduction
of evidence of the voidness of the supposed judgment. * * * In this case, it was necessary to go
outside of the judgment roll by the introduction
in evidence of an affidavit of jurisdictional facts
claimed to be deficient in order to prove the judgment void. This could not be done without such
pleadings as would be required in an independent action to set aside the judgment." (Emphasis
added.)
In the light of the foregoing statement it must be
admitted that appellants' cross-complaint is an "independent action" to set aside a judgment directly, and
not collaterally.
In support of appellant's position, the Court's attention is again directed to In re Waters, supra, (Utah p.
251):
"That a collateral attack upon the divorce
decree is atte1npted is not, in view of the allegations of the petition, grounds for sustaining the
demurrer and dismissing the cause. The petition
sets out the insufficiency of the affidavit for publication of sun1n1ons. Such affidavit and the order
made pursuant thereto are part of the judgment
roll. Sec. 104-30-14, R.S. 1933. Su.ch was not the
case when the decision of this Court in Liebhardt
v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 P. 215, was rendered. Therein, the Court, at page 256 of 40
Utah, at page 220 of 120 P., said:
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·· 'This Court has already held that an
affidavit and an order for publication of
sumnwns, not being a part of the judgment
roll and of the reeord, will not on a collateral
attack, be inquired into, and that a Court, on
such an attack, will not look outside the record itself to ascertain whether they were
properly n1ade or filed, but will indulge the
presu1nption that they were all that the law
required. Citing Amy v. Amy, 12 Utah 278,
+:2 P. 1121; Hoagland v. Hoagland, 19 Utah,
103, 37 P. 20.'
··Under the implicati.ons of the Liebhardt
ca8e, the allegations of the petition before the
lou·er court were perhaps sufficient to stttstain
a collateral attack on the divorce decree.'' (Emphasis added.)

The Court then significantly adds :
.. ,Ve are not, however, disposed to hold that
in such a proceeding as this, petitioner should be
trannnelled by the rules relative to collateral
attacks on a judgment. That a s1tit in equ.ity to
..:;pt aside a decree on the ground of want of jurisdiction in the Court rendering it or on the ground
of fra11d is a direct attack thereon is settled
doctrine in this State. Liebhardt v. Lawrence,
...;ltpra.
"Where the death of a party, whose alleged
fraud upon the Court cheated his adversary of
her day in Court, precludes the latter from lnaintaining a suit to set aside the decree, the same
latitude should be allowed as in such suit, to
Pstablish, in a proceeding in his estate, a right
purportedly cut off hy the allegedly void decree.
The

ag,qrie~·ed

party .-,1wuld be permitted to show
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to the Court the facts relative to such lack of
jurisdiction or fraud as would be permitted in
any direct attack on the judgment." (Emphasis
added).
The decision and opinion in the Waters case should
eliminate any possible question as to whether appellant's
cross-cmnplaint is a collateral or a direct attack, because
it makes no difference by which nan1e it is called. In the
language of Justice Straup in the Liebhardt case, supra,
any distinction in terms is :

"* * * groundless, and is based on a misconception of what may be directly and what collaterally attacked."
This point, inasmuch as it is referred to as a ground
of the trial court's judgment in this case, has been so
thoroughly resolved in Liebhardt v. Lawrence, supra,
that the court's opinion in that case is adopted by appellant as a most convenient argument against the trial
court's finding that appellant's cross-complaint is a
"mere" collateral attack upon the judgn1ent in the prior
action. Except as the law was changed to include the
affidavit and order for publication of summons as part
of the judgment roll (In re Waters, supra), which renders the prior judgn1ent void on its face (Appellant's
Point I), the Liebhardt case controls the question of
collateral attack. That case and the case at bar are
as identical as two cases can be, involving as they do,
almost identical facts and questions of law.
Also, in Weyant et al. v. Utah Savings & Trust Co.,
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supra, 54 r tah at p. 205, the Court held that an attack
upon a judgment charging fraud is a direct attack.
In the Weyant case, the Court said (Utah p. 205):
··When the respondents learned that they
had been despoiled of their inheritance, and under
the established rules of law and procedure they
could obtain no redress by direct appeal from
the decree of distribution in the probate proceedings, they were driven to seek redress in some
other proceeding and by an attack upon the
decree, provided they could establish the type of
fraud which authorized such an attack (Point II,
this brief) namely, extrinsic fraud. Under the
authorities already referred to, such an attack,
in this jurisdiction, is a direct attack."
Appellant's proof, pleadings and offer of proof
thereunder do not constitute a collateral attack upon
the prior default judgn1ent, but a direct attack in accordance "·ith the controlling law a~ stated in the foregoing
Utah decisions.
Appellant's true and proper defense to respondents'
present action to quiet title necessarily involves his
counterclailn pleading facts showing that a default judgment on which respondent relies is not only void on its
face but 'va~ obtained by fraud upon the Court. (Intermill v. Xash, supra).
Appellant can "see no reason why, in a suit based
on a purported judgn1ent * * * it 1nay not be avoided
in the ~ame suit in which such judgn1ent is to be introduced and used by laying the proper foundation for
introduction of evidence of the voidness of the supposed
jndgJ.nent." (.Justice Wolfe in lntermill v. Nash, supra).
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The institution of respondents' second action to
quiet title should estop them from objecting to appellant's pleading and proof of a legal and equitable counterclaim raising a triable issue involving the validity
of a default judgment. in the first action upon which
they admittedly rely, and which issue must of necessity
be primarily involved in any final adjudication of title.
If the record does not disclose the jurisdictional
defect the judgment is voidable :

Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 22
P. (2d) 1046, 1048, 82 Utah 179.
And extrinsic evidence is admissible to show tlw
jurisdictional defect:

Campbell v. Aderhold, C.C.A. Ga., 67 F. (2d)
246.
O'Donohue v. Boies, 53 N.E. 537, 159 N.Y. 87.
It is to be observed that in their answer to appel. lant's final cross-complaint, respondents admit and plead
the forn1er judgment in paragraph 2 of their Fourth
Defense, pp. 2 and 3 :
"Cross-defendants admit that they clai.In title
and ownership interests in said land under and
by virtue of said default judgment referred to in
the allegation of Paragraph 2 of said cross-complaint, but deny that cross-defendants' title and
ownership interests in said land rest solely upon
said default judgment * * * and * * * allege that
their ownership and possession are based 11pou
other meritorious rights and claims."
(Answer To Cross-complaint Amending And
Replacing Third Amended Cross-complaint.
supra, p. 26). (Emphasis added).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

75
E

Appellant's Cross-cornplaint Is An Independent Action In Equity Brou-ght To Annul Or
Facate The Judgment In Action No. 2388 .Upon
Equitable (As Well As Legal Grounds) As Fu.lly
::Jet Forth In Said Cross-complaint.
(Section 60 (b) U.R.C.P. 1950) .
.. An action in equity, brought to annul the
judgn1ent or set aside or vacate the same, alleging proper equitable grounds therefor, whether
by plaintiff in his complaint or counterclaim or
hy defendant in a. proper proceeding, is a direct
attack on the judgment." Intermill v. Nash, supra,
citing:

Liebhardt v. Lau-rence, 40 Utah 2-13, 120 P.
:215;

Riddle v. Q1tinn, 32 l-;-tah 341, 90 P. 893;
Wilson v. Hawthorne, 1-1 Colo. 530, :2-1 P. 548;
Leu in v. Gladstem, 1-12 N.C. 482, 32 L.R.A.
~ ew Series 905, note ;
Halleck v. Laft, 19 Colo. 7-1,34 P. 568;
Fallette v. Pac. Light d!; Power Corp., 189
Cal. 193, :208 P. :295, 23 L.R.A. 965;
Acton v. Lamberson, 102 Ore. -172, 202 P. -1:21,
73:2;

Xorthu·estern & Pac. Hypotheck Bank v. Redpath, 29 \Vash. 687, 70 P. 1392.
In the Intermill case, the Court says:
.. She (plaintiff) comn1enced the action as the
forn1 of suit to quiet title, without any
mention of the decree through which the defendant deraigns title. Defendant, in like manner,
eounterclaims to quiet title in her, without pleading the judgment or referring thereto, etc."
~implest
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"* * * Some basis must be laid in an attack
upon a judgment on matters de hors the record,
showing that if the allegations so laid are true,
the judgment must be void (Appellant's Point
II). In this _case, there is no such allegation.
It is evident, therefore, that there are no pleadings making an attack upon the judgment, or to
open the way for evidence de hors the record
as to its validity * * *." "Any question, therefore, as to jurisdiction (Appellant's Point I),
or, as to the validity of the judgment (Appellant's Point II) which does not show upon the
face of the record must be raised and brought
to the attention of the court by appropriate proceedings." (Emphasis added).
And:
"There is nothing appearing in the decree
or the deed to suggest or indicate a question as
to their validity ; * * *"
The Court points out, however, that:
"The affidavit of jurisdictional facts for
publication of summons was not, in 1929, a part
of the judgment roll, * * * and, therefore, is
probably not even evidence for inspection as
part of the judgment roll," which, however, appellant hastens to add, is not and was not true
when the affidavit was made in action No. 2388
in 1946."*
See: In re Waters, supra and infra.
In the case of Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Company, 43 Utah 277, 135 P. 105, at p. 105, the Court says:
"In an action to quiet title to real estate,
a plaintiff may assail a judgment, deed or any
other instrument affecting his title, for the reason
that such judgment or instruments are void, on
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the ground of fraud or for any other legal reason.
The prin1ary purpose of such an action is to
destroy or canrel the prin1a facie or apparent
effect of such judgment or instruments, and to
quiet the title to the real estate which is apparently clouded or affected thereby. If a judgment
is assailed in such action, the action is a direct
and not a callateral attack upon the judg1nent.
For cases directly in point, see:
Jlosby v. Gisborn, 17 Utah :257-283, 5± P. 12t;
Parsons v. lVeiss, 1±± Cal. 410, 77 P. 1007;
Dunlap v. Steere, 92 Cal. 344, 28 P. 563;
Bledsoe v. Price & Co., 132 Ala. 621, 32 So.
325;
JJ cCampbell v. Dtttrst, 73 Tex. 419, 11 S.W.
380;
Eichoff v. Eichojf, 107 Cal. 42, 40 P. 24;
Freeman on Jtttdgments (3rd Ed. 485);
Weyant et al. v. Utah Savings & Trust Co.,
54 rtah 181, at 201, 205, 212; 182 P. 189;
Liebhardt v. Lawrence, 40 Utah :Z-!3, 120 P.
:215."

I~

In Liebhardt v. LawrencP, supra, the Court declared,
at page 259 of 40 l~tah:

~:

1'

'~

'

Defects in the service of su1nn1ons 1nay be
assailed in a direct proceeding on grounds other
than jurisdiction. That is, the service though defective, may nevertheless be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction, and yet may, on a direct proceeding,
be successfully assailed on other grounds. We
think that is true here. The defect here is one
of ~ervice. That defect, as already suggested,
is not that the fact of non-residence was not
averred, but that a copy of the summons and
cmnplaint was not 1nailed; and that no facts or
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circu1nstances are stated, found, or made to
appear to excuse such failure. In dealing with
that question, we think the place of residence
of a non-resident defendant is very material.
The law abhors and forbids the taking of property from a person without notice and without his
day in Court. To proceed against and deal with
a thing within the jurisdiction of the Court, and
subject to the Court's seizure and control, the
statute provides for a constructive service on a
non-resident by a publication of summons. But
the intent and spirit of. the statute, in such case,
as well requires a copy of the summons and
complaint to be mailed to him, if his place of
residence is known. This is a wholesome provision and is not to be ignored. It ought to be
complied with. It is itself a part of the service* * *."
"Upon a presentation of an affidavit for a
publication of the summons on the ground of a
non-resident defendant, both the plaintiff in the
action and the clerk have duties to perform: The
plaintiff, by affidavit, to furnish the clerk the
evidence in respect of the fact that the defendant is a non-resident; the clerk, upon the evidence
so adduced, to determine that the defendant is
a non-resident and to direct or order a publication of the summons. But there the duties do
not end. The statute further requires that, 'where
the residence of a non-resident or absent defendant is known;' the clerk shall mail hi1n a copy of
the summons and complaint."
The Court then continues (p. 260):
"What do the words 'is known' mean~ Known
to whom? Personally known to the clerk~ Personally known to the plaintiff, or to the affiant
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making the affidavit on his behalf 1 Certainly
not. They do and can only mean if the place of
residence of the non-resident can, by reasonable
diligence or inquiry, be discovered, be ascertajned, be found."
And, (on p. 261):
"Non-residents, as well as residents, have
the right to acquire and hold property in the
State. In the absence of proof of actual service,
proceedings affecting them properly require careful scrutiny; and the Court, before entering a
iudgment taking it from them and giving it to
anotlzer, should see to it that not only one, but
that e1.:ery reqttirement of the statute providing
for a constructive service has, both in letter
and spirit, been strictly complied with * * *"
( En1phasis added).

And (pp. 261-262):

~-

""Here con1es a litigant into Court by a proceeding affecting the property of a non-resident
who for many years had the record title, except
as his rights thereto may have been diverted by
the tax sale, and seeks to take it from him, and
to claim it for himself. He caused an affidavit to
be filed by an agent that the non-resident 'resides
out of the State of Utah, and that his place of
residence is to the affiant unknown,' without
even stating that the place of residence is unknmvn to the litigant. The clerk manifests no
concern about it, and on the affidavit alone
directs and causes the summons to be published,
not in a 'newspaper designated as the most likely
to give notice to the person to be served,' but
in a weekly periodical least likely to give such
notice. There the 1natter rests, a'vaiting the time
to take the default. X o effort and no inquiry is
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rnade to ascertain or to discover the place of
plaintiff's residence (in the case at bar it was
known to affiant). The fact of the place of residence was regarded as wholly ilnrnaterial, and
that all that was necessary to know was that the
plaintiff was a non-resident. Hence, no copy of
the summons and complaint was mailed to him,
and no effort made to do so. Upon such a service, plaintiff's (cross-complainant's) property is
taken from hiln, and is given to the defendant
(cross-defendant)."
And, (p. 262):
"We do not think such a service, as against
a direct att.ack, is good, when it is made to appear,
as here, that the defendant's knowledge (the
plaintiff in the former action) of the place of
residence of the non-resident was negative, and
where, as here, he had ready and convenient
means of knowledge of such fact; and that upon
reasonable diligence and inquiry such place could
readily have been discovered and ascertained,
and a copy of the summons and complaint mailedn
(Emphasis added).
Under these authorities there can be no doubt that
appellant's cross-c01nplaint is a direct attack upon the
prior default judgment.
There can likewise be no doubt that the prior judgment is void as a fraud upon the court (Appellant'~
Point II) and that under appellant's direct attack the
judgment roll rnay be examined to prove the facts alleged
in appellant's cross-complaint under Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P.
Appellant's cross-complaint is clearly "an action
in equity, brought to annul the judgment, or set aside
or vacate the same" (Doyle v. West Temple Terrace
Co., supra).
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Where a judgtnent is pleaded as a defense to an
action, a party ( cross-con1plainant herein) has a right
to challenge and have the court pass on the validity of
the judgment and the proceedings under which it was
obtained.

St. Louis San Francisco Rwly. Co. v. Boyne,
40 P. (2d) 1104, 170 Okl. 542;
Southern Pine Lmnber Co. v. Ward, 85 P.
459, 16 Okl. 131.
_\ppellant was required to plead the facts set forth
in his answer and cross-complaint:

lntermill v. Nash, supra;
O'Quinn v. Tate, Tex. Civ. App., 187 S.\V. (2d)
241,49 C.J.S., p. 828.

~-

1·

It is thus beyond question that the court below
refused to follow the controlling law of Utah in holding
that appellant's appropriate and indispensable pleadings are a collateral attack upon the former judgment,
even though, for the purpose of respondents' motion
at least, all appellant's aver1nents of fact have to be
deemed true, and those averments demonstrate the invalidity of the judgment, tacitly admitted by respondents having brought this second suit to quiet the,ir alleged title
The record herein clearly demonstrates that the
by which plaintiff procured a default judg1nent
in the earlier action made it ilnpossible for defendantappellant to receive notice of that action or of the
judgment rendered therein. It is certainly not unreasonable to infer from the invalid process and the invalid
proce:-:~

rr;
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tax deed what induced respondents to file their second
suit to quiet title. It cannot be doubted that the insufficient, void and ambiguous affidavit, stating no jurisdictional facts, but inherently false as appellant has
offered to prove, fails to conform with statutory requirements or to furnish a jurisdictional basis for the
first or second (summary) judgment. The order for
publication of summons pursuant to the defective, false
and unauthorized affidavit amounted to no service of
process at all. For that very clear reason there was a
total lack of jurisdiction, even as to form, appearing
on the face of the record and the decree can, therefore,
be in1peached collaterally (Point I). Such a want of
jurisdiction cannot be supplied by a play on words,
or by looking to pure form and trying to sharply. distinguish that which needs no differentiation in this
case, namely, whether appellant's pleadings constitute
a "direct" or "collateral" attack upon the void judgment
upon which even respondents admit they would not
wholly rely in the present action (Stipulation, supra,
p. 8).
POINT IV.
THE CAUSE OF ACTION SET FORTH IN APPELLANT'S CROSS-COMPLAINT IS NOT (A) BARRED BY
RULE 60 (b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1950, OR (B) BY LACHES.

(A)

Appellant's cross-complaint was manifestly not a
motion under Rule 60 (b), (1) (2) (3) or (4) U.H.C.P ..
but an "independent action."
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Rule 60 (b) is substantially the same as Sections

104-14-4 of the former Utah Code of Civil Procedure:
.. With some deletions, and with the addition
of a subdivision 4 relating to setting aside a
judgment wh~re the party was not personally
served, * * .,
and relates to motions made in the smne case in which
the judgment was entered, and then expressly provides
that:
"This rule does not limit the power of a
Court to entertain an independent action to reliet·e a party from a judgment, order or proceedi-ng or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon
the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed
by these rules or by an independent action."
(Emphasis added).
Rule 60 (b) specifically providing for an independent
action, such as appellants cross-complaint to set aside
a judgment void on its face or for fraud upon the court,
recognizes the universally established right to equitable
relief from such a judgn1ent without lilnit as to ti1ne.
"Any statutory limitation of the time within
which an application to open or vacate a judgment 1nay be made must be observed in all applications to open or vacate made under, or within
the operation of the statute. Where, however,
the application is not made under the statute, or
on statutory grounds, but invokes the inherent
power of the court, as discussed in Sec. 265, supra,
the statutory limitation is generally deemed not
applicable and the power to vacate a proper case
is not lost by lapse of time or expiration of the
term."
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49 C.J.S. 288 and cases cited:
Liebhardt v. Lawrence, 40 Ut. 243, 120 Pac.
215;.

lntermill v. Nash, 75 Pac. 2d 161:
Higgs v. Burton, 58 Utah 103;
Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 43 "Gt. 277,
135 P. 103;
Kramer v. Pixton, 72 Ut. 1.
In Kramer v. Pixton, supra, the Court says:
''In the final analysis the contention of respondents is that appellant has had an adequate
remedy in the original action by motion or some
other proceeding therein to be relieved from the
effects of the judgment rendered * * *" and say~
further that "there would be much force in that
contention if it were not alleged in the complaint
that the time limited by the statute within which
appellant could move in the original case had
expired. It is alleged in the amended complaint
that appellant had no notice of the pendency of
the action in the District Court of Utah County
or judg1nent rendered therein until 30 days prior
to the commencement of the present action and
1nuch more than one year after the date of entry
of such judgment. It is provided in Cmnp. Law~
Utah, 1917, Sec. 6619, in enumerating the di~
cretionary powers of a District Court that :
'When, frmn any cause, the summons in
an action has not been served on the defendant, the Court may allow on such terms a:-:
1nay be just, such defendant or his legal
representative, at any time within one year
after the rendition of any judg1nent in such
action, to answer to the merits of the original
action.'
-
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.. It thus appears frmn the allegations of the
complaint that whatever ren1edy or right appellant may have had to appear by motion in the
original action was lost by lapse of time unless
a Court of equity could and would entertain jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the judglnent against him. Appellant is left without any
remedy whatever and would of necessity see his
property subjected to the payment of the judgment rendered against him without having had
his day in Court. It is axiomatic in the law that
for every wrong there is a remedy."

See also: In re Waters Estate, supra.
Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P. expressly au-thorizes an Independent Action for or a. motion for equitable relief from
a judgment.
Rule 60 (b) provides that the court may "on motion" (made in the same action) and "upon such terms
as are just"-"in the furtherance of justice" relieve a
party-from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following re·asons * * * ( 3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresenta.tion" or other misconduct of an adverse party"; (4)
where, for any cause, the smnmons in an action has not
been personally served upon the defendant as required
by Rule (4) (e) and the defendant has failed to a.ppe·ar
in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied * * * or it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application;
( 7) or any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
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The 1notion shall be 1nade not more than three
months after the judgment was entered if made for
reasons of ( 1) 1nistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect or for (2) newly discovered evidenc-e, or (3)
fraud, or (4) when sum1nons is not personally served
on defendant as required b~- Rule 4 (e).* There is no
time limit within u:hich a party nwy even by motion
made in the same action seek relief from a ( 5) void
judgment, other than "a reasonable time," or (6) u-lz.ere
"it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application" or ( 7) "where there is any other
reason justifying relief front the operation of the statute."
*Rule 4 (e) relates to personal service wi·thin this State.
Rule 4 (f) relates to service of summons on non-residents.

The note to this code provision states, in part: ''As
applied to a final order or judgment this rule is substantially the same as our Code 104-14-4."
This rule, as it relates to relief from judg1nent by
motion made in the smne action also provides (Pg. SS,
U.R.. C.P.):
"This rule does not limit the power of a
Court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court."
"The procedure for obtaining 'any relief'
from a judgn1ent shall be by motion as prescribed
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in these rules or by an independent action."
In view of the foregoing express provisions of Rule
60 (b), and applicable decisional law, the trial court's
finding that appellant's cross-cmnplaint is barred by that
rule is plainly erroneous.
(B)
APPELLANT IS NOT GUILTY OF LACHES IN THE
PREMISES. HIS CROSS-COMPLAINT CANNOT BE BARRED ON THAT GROUND.

On a motion to dismiss laches cannot be raised.

Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Penn. R. Co., D.C.
Pa. 12 Fed Sup. 720 (Rule 57 U.R.C.P.
(Appellant's Point VI).
But it could not be properly held in a trial of the
facts and it is absured to assume in this proceeding
that appellant is barred by laches.
The record affirmatively shows that appellant, within a reasonable ti1ne after service of process upon him
in the present action, by making inquiry concerning
the reason for the action, discovered the existence of
the earlier default judgment and seasonably thereafter
filed his cross-complaint herein directly attacking the
default judgment as being void on its face and a fraud
upon the court.
To the extent that respondents delayed bringing
this action and in failing to serve appellant with summons herein for a year after its commencement, they
are themselves responsible for the delay of appellant
in filing and presenting his eross-complaint directly attacking the forrner default decree. Respondents comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1nenced this action on the 22nd day of September 1948,
but service of process on appellant was not made until
the 16th day of Septen1ber, 1949. Thereafter (following the filing of his original answer to: respondents'
complaint), appellant Inade inquiry of respondents a:'
to the nature of respondents' claim to title to the land
involved, by writing to plaintiff's counsel and asking
him for an abstract of title which was promised but
not furnished appellant until the 19th day of December
1949.
Thus, it is clear fron1 the record that appellant
cannot properly be charged with unreasonable delay 1
or with laches, in filing his cross-complaint.
Certainly a party is entitled to object to a default
judgment procured by fraud upon the court andjor
void on its face within a reasonable time after the discovery of the existence of the judgn1ent and the fact:'
constituting the fraud by bringing an independent action
in equity to show the voidness of that judgment and that
it would be inequitable to give such judgment prospective
operation, or for ''any other reason justifying relief
from the judgment" (Ru1e 60 (b) U.R.C.P.): and a
judg~nent that is void on its face may be attacked at
any time ( 49 C.J .S., Sect. 231, pg. 445).
An independent action in equity instituted on November 19, 1936, to set aside a judgn1ent entered in a
prior action on Septe1nber 30, 1931, on the ground of
extrinsic constructive fraud or extrinsic mistake, \\·a~
not barred by laches where the facts constituting fraud
or 1nistake were not discovered until August 11. 1936:
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Antonssen v. Pacific Container Co., 48 Cal.
App. 535, 120 P. (2d) 148.
To same effect:

Scott v. Dilke, 47 Cal. App. (2d) 207, 117 P.
(2d) 700.
Cross defendants (respondents) are estopped from
pleading laches or the statute of limitations in this
case:

Adams v. Calif. 1lfutual Building & Loan
A.ss'n., 18 Cal. (2d) 487, 116 P. (2d) 75.
Under some persuasive authorities a judgment procured through fraud, collusion, deceit, or mistake 1nay
be attacked at any time, on a proper showing:

Stafford v. Stafford, 181 P. (2d) 491, 163 Kan.
162;
Zernnrray v. Kilgore, 177 So. 714, 130 Fla.
317.
Xeither the doctrine of laches nor the statute of
limitations applies to an attack on a judgment void
because of a want of jurisdiction, even though the attack
he collateral, since there is no time li1niting an attack
on a void judgment:

Garrison v. Blanchard, 16 P. (2d) :273, 127
Cal. App. 616.
A fact apparent from the mandatory record, showing that fundamental laws was disregarded in the establishment of the judgment, will render it null and void
for all purposes:

Stockyards National Bank v. Bragg, 245 P.
966, 67 Utah 60.
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Laches in attacking legal proceedings of which notice
should have been given, cannot be imputed to the moving
party if he was not notified:
Great West Min. Co. v. Alston Min. Co., 20
P. 771, 12 Colo. 46, 13 Am. S.R. 204:
Burningham v. Burke, 245 P. 977, 67 Utah 90.
In Burningham v. Burke, supra, the court held
that:
''Laches cannot be imputed to one who is
ignorant of the fact and for that reason failed
to assert her rights, and on such ground to bar
relief against fraud. Laches must not only consist of delay but of a delay which worked a disadvantage to the opposing party * * * ."
In Hamilton v. DooZy, at page 773, the court

state~:

"* * * the instances seem to be rare where
courts have declared that mere lapse of timt>
might effect a positive bar, even in cases of
purely equitable jurisdiction; while, on the other
hand, relief has frequently been granted, notwithstanding great delay, when substantial justice could yet be done between the parties."
Also the court says :
"What may be considered neglect in one
case may be regarded as reasonable diligence in
another. It does not appear that the controversy
is seriously embarrassed by the loss of evidence
or otherwise. Nor i~ it shown that the defendant's rights have been prjudiced by the delay.
The parties are about in the same situation a~
they were when the suit was com1nenced.''
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The doctrine of laches is not designed to punish a
plaintiff, and can be invoked only where to allow a claim
would, because of claimant's own acts, permit an unwarranted injustice:

McClelland v. Sha.w, 72 P. (2d) 225, 23 Cal.
App. (2d) 107.
"Moreover * * * the rule supported by the
w'"eight of authority is. that delay in asse·rting
a right does not of itself constitute lache,s."
30 C.J.S., p. 531, citing:

J!fary Jones Stevens Co. v. First Nat. Bldg.
Co., 57 P. (2d) 1099, 80 Utah 456;
Burningham v. Burke, supra;
Bankers Trust Co. v. Riter, 206 P. 276, 60
Utah 1.
See: Openshaw v. Openshatc, 1-!-l: P. (2d)
528, 105 Utah 574.

Appellant duly answered respondent's complaint
and prayed that his. own title be quieted long before he
discovered the existence of said default judgment. Upon
Pxamining abstract of title received from respondent's
attorney on December 19, 1949, appellant filed his original cross-complaint on J anuar~7 5, 1950. On 1\Iarch 27,
1950 appellant filed his first runended cross-complaint,
~pecifically attacking such judgment, when it appeared
that respondent's counsel had decided not to stipulate
that said judgment is void, after leading appellant to
believe he would do ~o. (Stanley letter, p. 4; (R. 236)
April 3, 1950).
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The :t;ecord shows that respondents could not possibly have suffered any disadvantage from these facts.
The record also shows that respondents' themselves and
the lower court are responsible for unnecessary delays
in the proceedings in this case.

Y.
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DISPROVES THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT IN ACTION NO. 2388 AND
PROVES

CONCLUSIVELY

THAT APPELLANT HAS A

MERITORIOUS DEFENSE THERETO AS WELL AS TO
RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT IN THIS SECOND ACTION.

Respondent Bowen had no title to quiet in action
No. 2388. The evidence (Abstract of Title) introduced
by respondents, together '"rith the stipulation of record
that Uintah County did not acquire legal title to the
property involved and that the County's void quitclaim
deed to Burns Hallet on September 22, 1943 and the
latter's quitclaim to J. Parry Bowen on December 20,
1945, show no title was conveyed to respondent Bowen.
The record further shows that respondent Bowen could
not have acquired title by adverse possession when
Action No. 2388 was com1nenced or when the default
judgment therein was obtained.
The respondent Bowen comn1enced Action No. 2388
on September 11, 1946, less than three years from
September 2:2, 1943 when his predecessor, Burns Hallet,
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acquired the void quitelailn deed from the County; and
since the decree was entered N ovmnber 13, 1946, only
three years and two Inonths had elapsed frmn the thne
respondent's predecessor received the void deed frmn the
County.
If the statute of liinitations in which title by adverse
possession could begin started frmn the tin1e a contract
was made hy the County to quitclain1 to Burns Hallet
and this contract was relied upon for color of title as
indicated in )Ir. Stanley's letter to appellant ( Statmnent
of Facts herein, p. 4), seven years had not elapsed
before the default judgn1ent was taken against appellant. The date of that contract was September 30, 1940
(Abs. of Title). Action ~o. 2388 was comn1enced September 11, 1946, and the default judgment entered therein, 'vas signed X ovember 13, 1946, and is marked filed,
Koven1ber 29, 1946, less than the seven years required
to establish title by adverse possession.
Thus, the record before the court shows that no
evidence of title existed to support the former default
judgment and the pleadings show that appellant was
the owner of the and involved when the default judgment
was taken against him ; also that he still ren1ains the
owner thereof unless the sunnnary judgment appealed
from is pern1itted to deprive hin1 of his ownership.
~\ppellant's

answer and cross-cmnplaint (which re~pondents' motion for smnmary judgment adn1its), and
the testiinony of appellant's witness Johnson, taken out
of order, show actual and continuous possession of the
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property h~' appellant and that neither respondent
Bowen, nor Hallet, occupied the land or any part thereof prior to the entry of said default judgment; and that
none of the respondents in this action have ever oceupied
said land or any part thereof.
"Although the party seeking relief must show
at least presumptively that he has a defense, the
requirement of a meritorious case does not necessitate an absolute guarantee of victory or a conclusive showing of sufficient cause of action or
defense. It is enough to present facts from which
it can be ascertained that the complaining party
has a sufficiently meritorious claim to entitle
hi1n to a trial of the issue at a proper adversary
proceeding; it suffices to establish good faith
and to tender a seriously litigable issue."
49 C.J.S., p. 704.
A 1neritorious defense need not be shown where
the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction, as where
defendant was never served:
Hollywood Gannent Corp. v. Beckennan, Inc.,
143 P. (2d) 738, 61 Cal. App. (2d) 658;
Leek v. Wieand, 71 Atl. (2d) 911, 7 N.J. Super,
501;
Wise v. Herzog, (D.C.) supra;
Burnett v. Dayton, 252 P. 397, 123 Okla. 156:
Finch v. Pacific Reduction cf: Ghent. lllfg. Co.,
234 P. 296, 113 Or. 670.

However, as stated, appellant has a meritorious
defense to respondents' action and is entitled to prove
it on a trial of the issues raised by the pleadings.
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VI.
THE Sl"T~I~1ARY JrDG~IENT APPEALED
!1,ROM IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE PROVISIONS
OF RULE 56 lTTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND VI:eOATES ITS EXPRESS PROVISIONS.

A.
The Summary Judgment Herein Violates The Express Prorisions Of Rule .56 (c).
A sUllllnary judgtnent is not authorized under this
Rule upon the record before the court, even though the
lower court ruled as a Inatter of law that appellant's
cross-cmnplaint "is a 1nere collateral attack on the judgment in Civil Action No. 2388, '' or because the court's
opinion is that said judgment is not void on its face,
or because the court's opinion is that appellant's crosscomplaint "does not allege that it is void on its face, but
is based on fraud" or because the court presun1es that
appellant is chargeable with laches (Findings and Conclu~ions, supra, pp. 32 et seq.).
Rule 56 (c) provides :
''The su1mnary judgment shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issne as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." (En1phasis
added).
Of course, the issue joined by the allegations of
respondents' cornplaint asserting title to the land and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

96
asking that it be quieted, and appellant's ans,Yer denying those allegations and clain1ing title in himself and
praying that the same be quieted as against the claim
of respondents, is a genuine issue as to material facts.
Neither the complaint nor the answer says anything
about a fonner judgment. (See: Respondents' Answer
to Appelant's Amended Answer).
The issue of respondents' claim of title by adverse
possession is a genuine issue as to material facts.
The issue of fraud raised in appellant's cross-complaint attacking the default judgment entered against
him in Action No. 2388 is a genuine issue as to material
facts; as also is the issue of alleged laches on the part
of appellant.
All issues presented by the pleadings relate to the
plea that the judgment attacked is res adjudicata.
The rule says that the record must show "that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law."
The question is: Does this rule authorize a trial
court on these equivocal and conflicting grounds to
render a summary judgment in disregard of genuine
issues as to material facts joined by the pleadings f
Or rnust the trial court try those issues and make its
findings and decree with respect thereto after a trial
thereof, regardless of his opinions on disputed questions
of law~ Is not a litigant entitled to a trial of all genuine
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issues joined involving 1naterial facts relating thereto
in the lower court, or u1ust he submit to, or be required
to appeal frmn, a sununary judginent against him disposing of the case, not on its Inerits, but because of a
trial judge's opinion or impression, always subject to
change, as in this case, that the issues of fact are imina.terial with reference to a disputed legal question all related
to a plea of res adjudicata~
If such is the n1eaning of Rule 56 (c) then it is conceivable that in a case such as this, the trial court n1ay
hold that the cross-complaint attacks a forn1er judgment
on the ground of fraud, and admitting the fraud it is a
collateral attack nevertheless and, therefore, all issues
of fact joined involving the merits of the case will be
disregarded and a 1notion for suminary judginent granted. If on appeal that ruling is reversed and the case
remanded for trial, another motion 1nay be 1nade and
granted for summary judgment on the ground that the
cross-complaint is barred by Ru1e 60 (b), from which
judgment another appeal is taken, resulting in its reversal ; then as the third trial begins another motion
for sumn1ary judgment is made on the ground that the
cross-cmnplaint does not attack the alleged void judgment on the ground that it is void on its face and, therefore, the motion is granted, and a third appeal is taken,
resulting in a reversal. Then, at the beginning of the
trial after the third appeal a n1otion is 1nade for summary judginent on the ground that the forn1er judgment
attacked is not void on its face and, therefore, it is res
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adjudicata, frmn which judgment a further appeal ii'
taken, resulting in another reversal. Then when the
the fifth trial begins a motion for summary judgment
is granted on the ground that the cross-complainant is
chargeable with laches in attacking the former judgment,
etc., etc., all in disregard of genuine issues of fact raised
by the cmnplaint and answer and by the cross-complaint
and answer thereto. This exaggeration is indulged in to
illustrate our position that Rule 56 (c) cannot conceivably mean and does not say that a motion for summary judgment may be granted and judgment entered
thereon because a trial court may believe that the moving
party Inay be entitled to such judgment on a disputed
question of law when there are genuine issues of fact
joined relating thereto and to the ultimate determination of the rights of the respective parties to the property involved.
There must be •·no genuine issue of fact" found if
the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment
as a matter of law. Where the pleadings disclose an
issue of fact relating to a plea of res adjudicata, the
parties should be afforded an opportunity to present
their proof, and the plea should not be determined on
a motion to dismiss.
Cutler v. llfetcalfe, 49 N.Y.S. (2d) 438, 28 App.
Div. 823.

B.
The Object of Ru.Ze 56 (c) And Of A Summary
Judgment Generally Is Not To Create A Nen· Right In
Favor Of A Party Nor To Substitute A New llf ethod
Of Trial.
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The reutedy of suum1a.ry judgntent is in derogation
of the cmnn1on law and exists only under authority of
statute.
'"* * * An exa.ntination of the so-called suinInary judg·1nent laws, both in England and in this
country, shows that the purpose of such law~
was to regulate procedure, and not to create a
new right in favor of a party plaintiff. They
were adopted to grant relief against procedural
tactics interposed for delay and not to s~tbstitute
a neu· method of trial, where an iss1le of fact
exists." (E1nphasis added).
Fisher v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. of N.Y.,
179 A. 70:2, 704, 705, 55 R.I. 175, 103 A.L.R.
1097.
The test is whether the record in this case discloses
triable issues of fact warranting a trial:
Cou·an Oil dl; Refining Co. v. Miller Petroleum
Corp., 295 P. 504, 112 Cal. App. Supp. 773.
"The power given to grant a sum1nary judgrnent Inust be exercised with care, and not be extended beyond its just limits, and before a party
is entitled to the benefits of such a statutory
remedy he should bring himself squarely within
the spirit and letter of the statute * * *."
49

c ..J.s., p. 386.

See: Prirensal v. Privensal, 67 N.E. 2d 580,
295 K.Y. 357:
Gardner v. Shreve, 202 P. 2d 322, 89 Cal. App.
2d 804.
Statutes authorizing ~u1nn1ary judgments "do not
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mination by the court of questions of law in advance
of a trial on the facts contrary to established practice,
or provide a substitute for existing methods in the determination of issues of fact."
49 Corpus Juris Sec., p. 387, citing:
Minuto v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 179 A.
713, 55 R.I. 201 ;
Fisher v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co., supra;
Walsh v. Walsh, 116 P. 2d 62, 18 Cal. 2d 439;
Gibson v. De La Salle Institute, 152 P. 2d 774,
66 Cal. A pp. 2d 609 ;
Tamblyn v. City & County of Denver, 194 P.
2d 299, 118 Colo. 191;
D. E. Sanford Co. of S. F. v. Cory Glas3
Coffee Brewer Co., 194 P. 2d 127, 85 Cal.
App. 2d 724.
Any doubt should be resolved against the right to
summary judgment:

Gibson v. De La Salle Institute, 152 P. 2d 774,
66 Cal. A pp. 2d 609 :
Hatfield v. Barnes (Colo.), 168 P. 2d 552.
"The statutes generally limit summary procedure to simple cases, where the moving party's
right to judgment is clear and free from doubt.''
49 Corpus Juris Sec. p. 388, notes 25 and 26.
See: Breech v. Piramide, 72 A. 2d 339, 4 N.J.
215;
Tromblyn v. City & County of Denver, supra.
It is to be observed that in their answer to appellant's final cross-complaint, respondents admit and plead
the former judg1nent in paragraph 2 of their "Fourth
Defense'' pg. 2 and 3:
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.. Cross-defendants adn1it that they clailu title
ru1d ownership interests in said land under and
by virtue of said default judgment referred to in
the allegation of Paragraph 2 of said cross-emuplaint, but deny that cross-defendants' title and
ozcnership interests in sa.id land rest solely ,npon
said default judgment * * ·" and * * * allege that
their ozt·nership and possession are based upon
other meritorious rights and claims."
(Answer to cross-cmnplaint amending and
replacing third runended cross-con1plaint (pg.
2-3, supra pg. 26).
If thi ~ is so, wherein lies the utter and extre1ue urgency
for disposing of appellant's ownership sunnnarily without an opportunity to prove or disprove these issuable
allegations~

In the case at bar respondents' n1otion was based
on the judgnwnt roll in Case X o. 2388, which record
\\·as subject to attac.k for the nmnerous sound reasons set
forth in appellant's pleadings and which respondents'
motion for su1mnary judgn1ent leaves uncontradicted.
"The test of a motion for smnn1ary judgtnent
is whether the pleadings, affidavits, and exhibits
in support of the motion are sufficient to over(·ome the opposing papers, and to justify a finding
as a n1atter of law that there is no defense to
the action."
Sfl(yrestant Credit U11ioll v. Jifrs. Trust Co.,

267 N.Y.S. 302, 305, 239 App. Div. 187.

·'The questions to be decided are whether the
facts set forth sufficiently show all that the case
will involve on a trial, and whether the evidence,
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including the pleadings and exhibits, clearly dem
onstrates that the movants are entitled to judg
ment in their favor."
49 C.J.S., p. 429, citing:
Bun Oil Co. v. Blevins, D.C., La., 29 F. Supp
901, affirmed C.C.A.;
Blevins v. Bun Oil Co., 110 F. (2d) 566:
Straus v. Straus, 203 P. (2d) 857, 90 Cal. App
(2d) 757;

U.S. Fidelity & Gty. Co. v. Sullivan, 209 P
(2d) 429, 93 Cal. App. (2d) 559.
"Where an action has been submitted to the
court on a motion for summary judgment only~
and has not been assigned for hearing on the
merits, it is error for the court to dispose of the
case on the merits after it appears that a decision necessarily involves the determination of a
controverted issue of fact."
See: Eston v. Robert Brown, Ltd., 282 N.\Y.
895, 287 Mich. 44.
Where the motion for summary judgn1ent is made
by plaintiff, he is required to sustain the burden by
submitting convincing proof that there is no real defense
or issue to be tried, something respondents on the record
in this case cannot possibly do for the reasons herein
noted.
The genuine issues involving material facts in thi~
case that cannot be properly disposed of by summar~·
judgment include (1) the issue of fraud, affecting the
validity of the default judgment in Civil Action No
2388; (2) the issue of respondents' claim of title b~
adverse possession tmder the color of title of saic
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default judgment, or under the invalid tax deed; ( 3) and
the issue of whether appellant is guilty of laches in
attacking sajd judgment after being inforn1ed of its
existence.
The trial court was not authorized by nwtion to
resolve these Inaterial issues of fact without a trial, nor
to try these issues, but only detern1ine whether there was
an issue to be tried. ( ±9 Corpus Juris Sec., Sec. 220,
p. 39±, :Notes 81-85). There being a material issue of
fact to be tried, the trial court had no power to grant
respondents' motion, appellant being entitled to have
said motion denied as a matter of right.

Louis S. Kaplan etc. v. Catlett, 1 A. (2d) 884,
121 X.J. Law 201;
Utah v. Dickenion, 82 N.Y.S. (2d) 356.
Since appellant alleges facts which, if proved, constitute a good defense to respondents' action, respondents' motion should not have been granted, even if the
court doubted the defense.

Grueninger v. Livingstone, 202 P ..(2d) 785,
90 Cal. App. (2d) 266.
"'.An answered case that presents actually
disputed and complicated facts subject to different interpretation, or absolute questions of law,
should proceed to an orderly and authoritative
determination of the facts by trial and should not
be smnmarily determined on 1notion for summary
judgment, even though what appears to be question of fact may ultimately resolve itself into
a question of law."
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49 Corpus Juris Sec., p. 397, Note 92, citing
Minu.to v. ll.fetropolitan Life Ins. Co., 179 A
713, 55 R.I. 201.

c.
The Summary Judgment Herein Invalidates Th1
Grounds Gil;en To Support It.
The record disclosing triable issues as to materia
facts Blust be resolved in favor of appellant on respond
ents' motion for suinmary judgment. The grounds giver
by the trial court for its judgment are contradicted anc
invalidated by the presumption that appellant's pleadings are true. Being true, the former default judgmen1
is void on its face, as well as a fraud upon the court
and cannot be res adjudicata of any issue in this casE
or otherwise entitle respondents to object to a trial i.IJ
which to prove or disprove the issues raised by thei1
pleadings.
Respondents' nwtion searched the record and admitted every material avern1ent in appellant's answers and
cross-cmnplaints, and did not challenge the sufficiency
or the truth of the facts therein alleged.
"b1ara v. C.S., D.C., N.Y. 54 F. (2d) 397:
Grady v. Eashley, 114 P. (2d) 635, 45 Cal.
App. (2d) 632;
Pagano v. Anz~tein, 55 N.E. (2d) 181, 29:!
N.Y. 326.
In consequence thereof, respondents' cause of action
was negated and appellant's defense was confirmed.
No finding of fact could be Blade adversely to appellant
inasmuch as the facts were resolved by the motion in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

105
"'

,-.

~-.

favor of appellant, whic.h the trial court's "'Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of La,v" and Summary J udgn1ent
ignore.
Testing the fac.ts alleged in appellant's answer and
cross-complaint by its leading and fundamental allegations (Wrathall v. Johnson, 40 P. (2d) 755, 86 Utah 50),
together with all fair and reasonable inferenc.es to be
dra\\-11 therefrmn (Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., SO P.
(2d) ±71, 95 rtah 490, 506), it is clear that those pleadings and the rec.ord plac.e in issue (1) the question of
respondents' adverse possession under c.olor of an invalid tax title, whic.h c.ould not give them title as they
could not have been in possession while appellant was
in actual as well as constructive possession, and, if in
possession, they could not have acquired title as against
appellant's record ownership for over thirty years by
alleged possession for a time less than is required to
acquire title by adverse possession as against appellant
owner; ( 2) and the rec.ord and pleadings place in issue
the judgment roll in the prior action, which is void on
its face because it is not in conformanc.e with statute;
(3) and is a fraud upon the court under the admitted
facts presmned by the motion; (4) which judgment
appellant attacked within a reasonable time after diseovery of the existence of said judgment and the fraud
by which it \vas procured.
The foregoing disputed facts, when fortified by the
indisputable presmnption of their verity, makes the
judgment of the trial court out as a monstrous error;
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and, when combined .with an adverse construction o
respondents' pleadings, as the law requires, it .become:
more than ever apparent as to just how appellant wa:
misled by respondents' equivocal allegations of owner
ship. So construing respondents' pleadings, respond
ents should be estopped on elementary equity principle:
from contesting appellant's right to properly defen(
against diverse claims of title to appellant's propert)
which chiefly consists of an attempt, thus far successful
to prevent appellant from defending his title and own.
ership of his property; just as he was prevented fron
defending his property against the perfunctory rendi·
tion of the default decree without jurisdiction in tlu
earlier proceeding.
Respondents adn1it the untruth of their own alle·
gations, so they have no title unless the former defaul1
judgment is res adjudicata, which it cannot be if th~
facts plead by appellant are adn1ittedly true. The re·
suiting judgment is therefore a self contradiction.
Harman v. Yeager, 110 P. (2d) 352, 100 Utal
30;
Consolidated Steelcraft v. Knowlton, 199 P
(2d) 149, Utah;
J.lfooney v. Phillips Pet. Co., 206 P. (2d) 977
201 Okla. 426;
Doyle v. Doyle, 89 P. (2d) 305, 184 Okla. 572
First Nat'l. Bank v. Conway Road Estate
C.C.A. (Mo.), 94 F. (2d) 736, certiorar

denied 58 S. Ct. 1047, 304 F.S. 578,
Ed. 1541.

~~

L
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In concluding this Point, appellant inquires: How
could respondents and appellant each be the owners in
actual and constructive possession of the property involved at the san1e time ·1 How could the adinitted facts,
which impeach the prior default judgment and prove it
to be void and a fraud upon the court justify the trial
court's conclusion that these facts, if true, do not invalidate the prior judg1nent but adversely conclude the very
issues to which they fayorably relate 1
VII.
THE DEFAULT JUDG~IEN"T IN ACTION NO.
:2388 AND THE SVJ\LMARY JUDGJ\IENT HEREIN
BASED THEREON DENIES .APPELLANT HIS
COXSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF
LA,V.
It is not appellant's position that the Utah Statute
is unconstitutional. Appellant's position is that its provisions for due process of law were not complied with.

Appellant has shown under the preceding Points
herein and appellant's Statement of Facts the manner
in which he was deprived of his property without due
process of law as provided by the Utah Statute in Action
Xo. 2388, and those facts should require no restatement
or re-argument here. Suffice it to point out that if, on
summary judgment, the· former void decree which contradicts the record herein is held to be res adjudicata,
or a final determination of title to appellant's property,
then appellant shall have been deprived of his property
without due process of law.
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Naisbett v. Herrick, 290 P. 950, 76 Utah 575.
In Naisbett v. Herrick, supra, Pac. at p. 953, th
Court states the law applicable to the record in the cas1
at bar as follows:
"If a rnoving party shows (1) that he ha
not been personally served with process, (2) tha
he had no actual notice of the pendency of th1
action in tirne to appeal and make his defense
(3) that he is injuriously affected by the judg
ment, and, (4) that he has tendered an issue t•
the merits of the claims of his adversary, the1
and in such case he has an absolute right to havt
the judg~nent opened."
And again on page 953, Pac., the Court observes:
"In proceedings to open default judgments
the courts quite generally distinguish betweer
those judgments where personal service of sum
mons has been had or personal appearance ha~
been made before judgment and those judgmenb
where there has been rnerely constructive servic~
of process."
As to the ruanner of service of process in the casE
at bar, the court in Naisbett v. Herrick, supra, 290 Pac.
at page 954 held :

"* * * if the manner in which eonstructiv(
service of process is had is not calculated to giv(
actual notice to the person served, then ther(
is no presumption that such person had aetna
notice, and the burden is cast upon the opposin~
party to show actual notice. Due process of la"
requires that before one can be bound by a judg
rnent affecting his property right, some procef;:
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must be served upon him which in some degree
at last is calculated to give him notice * * *. If
it be true that appellant was in possession of the
premises involved in this proceeding at the time
suit was begun and thereafter respondent may not
be heard to say that appellant was an unknown
clailnant of the preinises and thereby secure service of process by publication as was done in
this case ,. * * ."
~tatutes providing for constructive service are construed to in1pose on the c01nplainant in an action to
quiet title the affirn1ative duty to n1ake a bona fide and
reasonably diligent inquiry to ascertain the names and
residences of persons claiming or owning an adverse
interest to thus con1ply with the requirements of due
process of law. In all cases it must be made reasonably
probable that the defendant to be charged shall receive
actual notice as a result of the constructive service:

Jluchtier v. Pizzu.ette, 48 S. Ct. 259, 276 U.S.

13, 72 L. Ed. -!-!6, 57 A.L.R. 1230 (reversing
State Court).
Su.gg v. Hendrix, C.C.A.

~Iiss.

142 F. (2d) 740;

Schaaf v. Brown, 200 S.W. (2d) 909, 304 Ky.
466.

·'Judgments in rem procured by fraudulent
1neans or collusion are not, as a general rule, res
judicata against a direct attack based on such
grounds and made by a person who did not participate in the wrongdoing, and where they are
rendered without jurisdiction they are wholly
void and have no binding effect in other litigation
as a bar or estoppel."
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50 C.J.S. p. 552;
Campbell v. Sherley, 76 S.W. 540, 25 Ky. 1
904;
34 C.J. p. 1174 Note 22, 23;
Hamilton Nat. Bank v. American L. & T. Co
100 N:\V. 202, 72 Neb. 81;
Schrenkeisen v. Kroll, 85 N.Y.S. 1072.

"* * * In the absence of personal service o
a party * * * the judginent has been held vali'
only as to issues necessarily litigated, not as t
those which might have been litigated had h
appeared, and the tendency of modern authorit:
has been held not to allow decrees in rem an'
binding effect as estoppels by verdict, except, ~
course, where the collateral action is betwee:
persons who were parties in fact to the proceed
ings in rem, and contested there the issues sough
to be re-litigated." (Emphasis added).
50 C.J.S., p. 552, and cases there cited.
"Substituted service is due process of la'
* * * only where there is some reason or necessit;
therefor, and, where there is no reason why per
sonal service cannot be had, personal servic~
is nec~ssary to constitute due process even as tc
property within the jurisdiction of the Court.'
16 C.J.S., pp. 1257-1258 and cases there cited
Hilton Bros. Motor Co. v. Dist. Court. 10!
Utah 526, 167 P. (2d) 973;
D. & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Ind. Accid. Comm., 7•
Utah 316, 279 P. 612.
The court in assuming jurisdiction in action numbe
2388 and rendering the default judgment therein violatec
the powers conferred upon it hy constitutional and stat
utory provisions for due process of law.
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THE JUDGMENT IN ACTION NUMBER 2388
CANNOT BE RES

ADJl~DICATA.

If the former default judgment is valid then it might
be res adjudicata as to all n1atters it could be held to

have concluded without a trial; but if, as appellant
respectfully insists, it is void on its face, a fraud upon
the court and appellant and in violation of appellant's
constitutional rights, it could not be res adjudicata of any
ISSUe.

The principle of res adjudicata does not apply where
the attack upon a judgment showing it is void is made
in an independent action in equity to set it aside.

Lake v. Bonynge, 161 Cal. 120; 118 Pac. 535;
Patterson v. Almond City Land Co., 40 C.A.
285, 180 Pac. 823.
\Ve cite the foregoing authorities because of the
lower court's ruling that the forn1er default judgment
is res adjudicata. It is clear that in an action against
a non-resident defendant who has not been personally
served with process or appeared and litigated any issue
that a default judgment against him cannot be res
adjudicata against an attack on the ground that it is
void.
CONCLUSION

The sum and substance of this case and applicable
law poses one fundamental question: Whether a default
judgment, void on its face and obtained by fraudulent
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· methods, by abuse of the processes of the Court an
fraud upon the Court, in an action to quiet title, can b
held to sustain another action to quiet title to the sam
property brought by the same plaintiff against the sam
defendant because of the questionable validity of th
former judgment, by holding that such judgment is re
adjudicata and cannot be attacked.
We apologize to this Court for what the Court rna:
well regard as a too lengthy brief with llllnecessar:
repetitions and citations. Our excuse is that the severa
points relied upon by respondents and the lower Com'
to sustain the summary judgment are, at least in par1
the cause of supererogation in dealing with them.
Respectfully submitted,

CULBERT L. OLSON
(In Pro Per)

CLYDE S. JOHNSON
CYRUS G. GATRELL
Attorneys for Appellant
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